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ABSTRACT
ISAAC LICHLYTER: The Middle Class and Democracy in Contemporary Russia
(Under the Supervision of Joshua First)

Building on Lipset's modernization theory, this thesis makes the argument that a
robust, independent middle class is vital for the long term sustenance of liberal
democracy in Russia. Following a discussion of scholarly literature on what constitutes
democracy and the middle class, a historical analysis compares and contrasts the
trajectories of the middle class and democracy in Russia from the late-Soviet Era to the
present, This thesis draws on public opinion polling, media reports (both Russian and
foreign), and scholarly works to perform a mixed qualitative and quantitative analysis to
show that middle class Russians provide the most reliable base of support for democracy
and that it has been the weakness of the middle class which has left Russia vulnerable to
an illiberal relapse. Moving forward, this suggests that promoting economic growth in the
middle class is the best method to encourage democracy in Russia and that any brief
forays in to democracy are unlikely to prove sustainable unless they are preceded or
accompanied by a corresponding growth of the middle class.
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Introduction
Following the fall of communism in Russia in 1991, there was a general sense in
the West that a genuine opportunity existed to transform Russia into a western-style
country both economically and politically, The Russian Federation's constitution —
ratified in 1993 — was designed to usher in a new era marked by a respect for the rule of
law as a means of creating and preserving a liberal democratic form of government. Since
then, many academics in both Russia and the West have worried about a gap between
promises of civil freedoms and practical realities. Upon initial inspection, Russia
possesses the institutions — popularly elected executive and legislative branches as well as
an independent judiciary — to consolidate democracy. In just the last year however,
troubling events have taken place including the perceived manipulation of both
parliamentary and presidential elections, legislative crackdowns on protest movements,
and increased restrictions on non-governmental organizations. This thesis proposes that
one of the fundamental reasons the illiberalization of Russian politics has been and is still
occurring is that no independent middle class exists which can effectively muster broad
popular support in favor of liberal democracy.
Research Description

This thesis begins by synthesizing previous scholarship regarding democratization
theory, characteristics of liberal democracy, and the middle class as a socio-economic and

political identity. Building upon this foundation, it draws on public opinion polling,
media reports (both Russian and foreign), and scholarly works, to chart the history of
liberal democracy as it has actually been realized in Russia since 1987. Although the
thesis adheres to a somewhat narrative form at times, there is also an academic analysis
of the data underlying my work.
My analysis is divided into four sections each representing a distinct time period.
The interval from Gorbachev to the fall of the Soviet Union establishes a foundation for
the succeeding chapters by describing the lack of both a middle class and liberal
democracy during the waning days of the USSR. Incorporating Remington's notion of a
property-less bourgeoisie, it explains how the controlled nature of the economy inhibited
the development of a truly independent middle class resulting instead in a proto-middle
class lacking the motivation and means to effectively push for political rights. The second
stage charts the period from the ratification of the Russian Constitution in 1993 through
mid-2001. I have labeled that period the age of the oligarch because of the emergence of
a new economic elite during this period which used their wealth to exert considerable
influence on the political process while simultaneously using the political process to
protect their wealth and influence. The result was a stunted middle class stuck between
the power hungry elites and economically marginalized lower stratum of society. Putin's
campaign against the oligarchs as a class — exemplified in the prosecution of Yukos

billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003 — constitutes the third time period. If the
Yeltsin years represent illiberal governance due to the interference of economic elites in

politics, the Putin years swing towards the other extreme — a re-centralization of
government control over economic elites and society as a whole. Dmitri Medvedev's four
year stint as president and Putin's return to power earlier this year in an apparently
managed transfer of power represents the final era. This time period is characterized by a
more assertive middle class, manifested by the unprecedented protests of 2011 and 2012,
which could potentially change the Russian political landscape if it continues to grow.
Background
The idea of a connection between the middle class and democracy in Russia is an
outgrowth of an apparent contradiction in public opinion polling data. According to polls,
most Russians simultaneously have a low opinion of the current state of Russian
democracy and a favorable opinion of President Vladimir Putin.' Attempting to reconcile
this apparent dichotomy leads to the potential explanation that Russians place a higher
priority on some goal other than democracy. One probable candidate is economic well
being, and in fact polling data shows that 75% of Russians believe a strong economy is
more important than good democracy.” For comparison, in the U.S. that number is just
44% and drops to 37% in Great Britain and 27% in France.’ Such an attitude seems
indicative of economic insecurity among non-middle class Russians which makes them

'
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Pew Research Center, “Views of Democracy”, Global Attitudes Project, December 2011,

http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/12/05/chapter-1-views-of-democracy/ (accessed April 11, 2013);
Levada Center, Hxdexco! od0o6penua Oeamenbnocmu Baadumupa ITymuna u JImumpua Medeedesca,
[Approval Rating Index of Vladimir Putin and Dmitrii Medvedev], August 2012,
http://www. levada.ru/indeksy (accessed April 13, 2013)
Pew Research Center, “Public Opinion in Russia: What is more important, a good democracy or a
strong economy?”, Global Attitudes Project, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?
indicalor=48 &survey=14&response=A%20stronz%20economy&mode=table (accessed Apri! 11, 2013)
Pew Research Center, “Public Opinion in Russia,” 2012
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willing to tolerate a diminution of civic freedoms in exchange for economic stability. This
leads to the premise that transforming such low-income citizens into an independent
middle class is a key requisite for the establishment of a stable, liberal democracy.
My research seeks to follow the development of both democracy and a middle
class in Russia from perestroika until the present and explore the gap between
institutional promises and true, liberal democracy as both a political and socio-economic
phenomenon. In particular, it looks for evidence of a link between a robust middle class
and sustained democratic liberalism using the Russian Federation as a single case study.
This approach is an application of Lipset's modernization theory — which will be
discussed momentarily — which can be used to supplement M. Steven Fish's school of
thought which posits that political institutions are central to a country's political situation
— in this case the formation and consolidation of democracy.’ My research does not
contest the well documented influence of institutions on national political outcomes.
Instead, it seeks to expand the focus of democratization theory to account for the impact
of the socio-economic makeup of a country on its institutions and resulting politics.
The significance of my thesis lies in its ability to potentially forecast the political
trajectory of the Russian Federation as well as identify a factor which could alter that
trajectory. Once the factors most pivotal to the health of liberal democracy have been
identified, they can be observed and measured. These observations can then be used to

more confidently predict emerging trends of Russian democracy. From an academic

*

M. Steven Fish, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. |

[2006]: 5
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standpoint, this is useful in furthering a detailed understanding of democratic
development in non-Western countries. From a political standpoint, an understanding of
the root factors preventing the consolidation of democracy in Russia is critical for
formulating effective policy proposals. The link between the middle class and democracy
is also relevant to intelligence interests as it is intimately connected to forecasting the
future of one of the largest geo-political powers. An inquiry into the true foundation of
democracy in Russia is thus not only an academic exercise but also a relevant practical
concern.
Concepts and Theories Explained
To set the stage for my research it is first necessary to explain several important
concepts and theories from which my research will draw heavily. Perhaps the most
fundamental term to be expounded upon is democracy. In his work Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy, Joseph Schumpeter argues that democracy is a means of
making political decisions in which the people themselves decide issues by choosing
individuals — through free and fair electoral processes — to carry out their will.°
Significantly, this includes the ability to evict politicians who do not conform to the
popular will. Political scientist John May has provided a related though slightly more
expansive definition notable for its clarity and coherence. According to May, democracy
is defined by responsive rule; or in other words a correspondence between the
government's actions and the desires of the governed.’ There are auxiliary mechanisms
°

Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 5" ed., [London: George, Allen & Unwin,
1976]
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 1976
John D. May, “Defining Democracy: A Bid for Coherence and Consensus,” Political Studies 26, no. |
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which contribute to the administration and maintenance of democracy such as the extent
of suffrage, but at its root democracy merely refers to governance in accordance with the

will of the populace.
Liberal democracy is related to democracy, but has several additional
characteristics. Foweraker and Krznaric lay out a minimalist definition of liberal
democracy as a system where there is competition among a plurality of parties for power
through free and fair elections.’ But liberal democracy involves not only the
responsiveness of a government to its citizenry, but also a certain expectation of civic
freedom. Bollen defines the measure of liberal democracy as “the extent to which a
political system allows political liberties and democratic rule.”"” Political liberties are

subsequently defined as the extent to which “people of a country have the freedom to
express a variety of political opinions in any media and the freedom to form or participate
in any political group.”"' In summary, liberal democracy consists of a society possessing
a free media, unconstrained by undue government influence and multiple political parties
that genuinely compete for control of the government in free elections untainted by
tampering.
Defining the middle class is a somewhat more complex task. Approaches vary

from economic to socio-political and everywhere in between. One popular conception of

8
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[1978]: 1-14
John D. May, “Defining Democracy,” 1978
an Empirical’ and
Joe Foweraker and Roman Krznaric, “Measuring Liberal Democratic Performance:
Conceptual Critique,” Political Studies 48 (2000]

Measures,”
Kenneth Bollen, “Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National

American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 4 [1993]; 1208
Tbid.,
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a middle-class individual in Russia is related to consumption — owning a car, a flat, and a
dacha or country home.’? A 2011 study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences took
an economic approach and defined the middle class as individuals who spend between 30
and 37.3% of their income on food.” In a more in depth study of the American middle
class, Blumin proposes 5 factors which distinguish the middle class: work, consumption,
residential location, voluntary associations, and family organization.'* Ian Scott's analysis

of the middle class in Zambia highlights the influential role of the middle class as
members of “learned professions” also referred to as the managerial bourgeoisie.°
Applying these ideas to Russia, the middle class is currently distinguished economically
by its spending a relatively lower percentage of its income on essentials such as food
compared to lower income strata. This spending pattern leaves the middle class with a
disposable income that allows it to purchase some consumer durables — a laptop, car,
etc.!6
The middle class though is not merely an economic concept. The middle quintile
of income in a country does not naturally possess some mystical power over the
formation and direction of governance in a society. Rather it is the personal independence
a mid-level income allows individuals to achieve that is relevant to this investigation of
Russian society. A relatively high level of income allows for individuals of the middle
Suvi Salmenniemi, Rethinking Class in Russia, [Farnham: Ashgate, 2012]
Wang Hairong, “Defining the Middle Class,” Beijing Review, September 5, 2011,
http://www. bireview.com/quotes/txt/2011-09/05/content_387890.htm (accessed April 14, 2013)

Stuart Mack Blumin, The Emergence of the Middle Class: Social Experience in the American City
1760-1900, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 11
Ian Scott, “Middle Class Politics in Zambia,” African Affairs 77, no, 308 [1978]: 321

Hiroaki Hayashi. “Uniqueness of Russian Middle Class and Its Future.” Journal of Comparative
Economic Studies 3, [2007]: 37-38
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stratum to consider political issues on a more ideological basis rather than purely as a
series of pragmatic economic questions.'’ The confluence of the economic and sociopolitical nature of the middle class is best laid out by Alina Shakina in her analysis of the
Russian middle class. She writes that “first, there is their economic independence. Second

is their professionalism and the high self-esteem to which professionalism gives rise,
their sense that they are important to their society. From this comes the third feature: their
clear sense of civic duty. All this makes it possible for the middle class to perform
stabilizing social functions, similar to those that in the human body are performed by the
spine,””'®

The position of the middle class is also unique in that it avoids the illiberal
tendencies of both the elite and lower income strata of society. Its position in the middle

means that it opposes systems of government predicated on the concentration of wealth
among the few as well as the populist distribution of wealth to lower economic strata of
society.’ The middle class also values democracy as a means of ensuring a fair
application of the rule of law.”° Instead of focusing on personal connections, the middle

class seeks to focus on creating a legal framework to create a level playing field for
society.”' As a result, an independent middle class has both the means and the unique
"Abraham Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 [1943]: 370-96;
Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, [New York: Harper, 1954]
's Alina Shankina, “The Middle Class in Russia,” Russia Social Science Review 45, no. 1 [2004]: 28
Brian Anderson, “Russia on the Verge of Democratic Reform,” In Russian State and Society in Political
Crisis, translated by Dmitry Belanovsky, edited by Brian Anderson, Rebecca Baldridge, and Mikhail
Dmitriev [Center for Strategic Research, 2012]
http:/Avww. hhs.se/SITE/Publications/Documents/Russian%20State%20and%20Society%20in
%20Political%20%D0%A
Irisis.pdf (accessed April 14, 2013), 156
0 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, “Mobilizing the Unmobilized,” Current Digest of the Russian Press 63, no. 20
[May 16, 2011]
” Tbid.,
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|

inclination to act as a check on the government — a concept which is central to my
analysis.
An understanding of existing theories of democratization is a necessary
prerequisite to an investigation of the practical inner-workings of Russian democracy.

Perhaps the most basic divide in democratization theory is between the elite oriented
approach of O'Donnell and Schmitter and the modernization approach of Lipset.

O'Donnell and Schmitter — along with others such as Kaufman and Przeworski — argue

that a schism among the ruling elites is the most likely cause of a transition from
authoritarianism to democracy.” Lipset on the other hand argues that there is a correlation
between how economically developed a country was and how likely it is to support
democracy.” In Lipset's view, economic development does not guarantee democracy, but
strongly encourages an environment in which it could develop. My analysis of
democracy in Russia seeks to combine these two approaches. Elite agency may prove
decisive as a catalyst for a transition to democracy, but economic development which
supports the formation of a middle class can be considered a requisite for the
consolidation of a stable, liberal democracy.
My thesis also addresses the more institutional theory of democratization
embodied by M. Steven Fish's assertion that a country's particular political institutions —

22.
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Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” in

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986]
Seymour Lipset. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53 [1 959]
Franziska Deutsch and Julian Wucherpfennig. “Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence
Revisited.” Living Reviews in Democracy | [2009]: 1-8
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specifically an empowered legislature — are critical factors in the success or failure of
democratization.” The statistical support for Fish's theory is convincing but at the end of
the day fails to explain why specific countries choose to create a legislature with minimal
power or one with substantial control of the government. It is this gap that my thesis
seeks to fill. By examining the impact of socio-economic structures on politics it provides
a supplementary explanation to Fish's purely institutional approach. In essence, while a
weak legislature left Russia vulnerable to an authoritarian relapse, it was the weakness of
the middle class that allowed for the consolidation of power in the executive rather than
the legislature,
An analysis of the middle class's importance for democratization and democratic
consolidation must also take into account the relationship between the middle class and
civil society. Civil society, according to Gill and Markwick is composed of groups
autonomous to the state who are able to project and defend the interests of their
constituents against the state.” The critical components of this civil society are a public
sphere in which it is acceptable to discuss and debate political issues, state recognition of
autonomous groups and a reciprocal recognition by societal groups of the state's

prerogative in certain areas.”’ Not all civil socicty is inherently political. Gill and
Markwick differentiate between first order groups — groups organized around personal
friendship or a shared hobby — second order groups — groups which actually represent
interests which may or may not be political — and third order groups — specifically
2s

Fish, “Stronger Legislatures,” 10-12
Graeme Gill and Roger Markwick, Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin, [Oxford:

7

Tbid.,

Oxford University Press, 2000], 6
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politically oriented groups including political parties.”* In the Soviet period, civil society
was confined to first and second order groups which meant that the initial impetus for
reform had to come from within the regime itself.”” While the reforms eventually took on
a life of their own, it is important to understand that the lack ofa middle class impacted
the course of perestroika by denying reformers a solid social base which supported
democratization.
My analysis also incorporates the psychological theory developed by Abraham
Maslow regarding humans' hierarchy of needs. To briefly summarize, Maslow divided all
human needs into five basic categories: physiological, safety, love/belonging, esteem, and
self-actualization.*® The most basic of these categories is physiological and all the
categories build on each other so that as a general rule a person must first feel safe as
regards to their body, employment, and resources, before they prioritize development of
their esteem and self-actualization.*! My thesis applies this theory to the socio-economic
and political sphere by proposing that individuals are not inclined to concern themselves
with issues of self actualization — civil freedoms and pluralistic political participation —
until they feel secure in a personal and economic sense. The middle class as I have
defined it meets this criterion of economic security which is why they have the potential

to be such a force for liberal.democracy,”
Ibid.
Tbid., 10-11
30

Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 1943

*!
*?

Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 1954
While elites also meet the criteria of enjoying economic security, I argue that their economic security is
linked to a maintaining of the status quo in illiberal states which discourages them from acting as a
force for liberal democracy. There are certainly exceptions to this rule, but as a general principle elites
lack the middle’class's affinity for democratization.

11

My approach to the question of the Russian experience with democracy is
significantly influenced by the work of Stephen Kotkin, author of Armageddon Averted,
Richard Sakwa, who wrote Putin: Russia's Choice, and Gordon Hahn, who has
extensively studied the fall of the Soviet Union. To briefly summarize Kotkin, the

political transition after the fall of the Soviet Union was not one to democracy, but rather
a transfer of power between Russian elites.?? There were efforts such as those by Chubais

to break the power of the old system by expanding the pool of individuals with a stake in

the political system,” and their ultimate failure left democracy without deep roots in
society and made it vulnerable to exploitation by illiberal forces.** Instead of focusing on
the socio-economic reasons for this lack of connection, Kotkin takes a more institutional

approach and faults Russia's political institutions — specifically the Executive branch —
for failing in this task.*° Nevertheless, Kotkin recognizes the critical nature of rooting the
state in organized social constituencies.
Hahn also finds that the transfer of power surrounding the fall of the Soviet Union
was orchestrated from above by elites rather than from below by the masses.”’ According
to Hahn, this type of transition differed from the situation in other post-Soviet including
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary where actors independent of the state

negotiated the transfer of power.** Hahn blames a lack of organization and resources

3

Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted [Oxford University Press, 2001], 107
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(bid., 103-136
Tbid., 148
Tbid., 152, 170
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Gordon Hahn, Russia's Revolution from Above, 1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution
2
2002],
s,
Publisher
Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime, [New Jersey: Transaction
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12

among the popular movement to change for sidelining the forces of revolution from
below leaving them to exploited by the bureaucrats and nomenklatura during the
transition period.” Going further, Hahn argues that the top-down nature of Russia's
transition is responsible for the currently stunted nature of Russia's democracy.”
Sakwa is more focused on the specific details of Russia's political development
since Putin's first appointment as president in 2000. While arguing that Russia in fact
represents a country transitioning to democracy, Sakwa acknowledges the historic
instability and vulnerability of those democratic ideals. Sakwa is most concerned with the
measures which have reduced political pluralism in Russia to almost nothing. This
includes heavy restrictions on political parties and non-governmental organizations.*!
Perhaps most significantly, Sakwa mentions the emergence of a “state bourgeoisie”
dependent on regime politics.” This is not an independent middle class:— a managerial
bourgeoisie — but rather a social group which may exhibit some economic characteristics
of middle class life while actually providing social support for an illiberal regime.”
There has also been some previous investigation of the link between the middle
class and democratic liberalization. To highlight just a few academic works informing
this thesis: Ronald Glassman's pair of volumes — The Middle Class and Democracy in
Socio-Historical Perspectives and The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global

*®
©

Tbid.,, 2-3
Thid., 4

“|

Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, 2™ ed., [London: Routledge, 2008], 105

”
*

Tbid., 136
As J explain in Chapter 2, employment by the state is a serious barrier to real economic independence as
employees are in an inherently vulnerable position and face serious disincentives to openly opposing
government policies including employment termination
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Perspectives — use a historical analysis to further develop Lipset's argument that the
middle class is important for democracy. Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens's The

Impact of Economic Development on Democracy, deals with the impact of economic
development on democratization more broadly although their principles can be applied to
the middle class. Finally, Leventoglu's “Social Mobility, the Middle Class, and Political

Transitions” deals with outside factors affecting the middle class — specifically economic
stability — to explain the conditions under which the middle class is most supportive of
democratic transitions. The first two authors provide further theoretical support to the
idea that economic development spurring the growth of a middle class is fortuitous for
democratization while Leventoglu's idea spurred my examination of the factors which
can mitigate or even eliminate support for democracy among ostensible members of the
middle class. Instead of economic stability however, my analysis focuses on the
significance of government employment in reducing middle-income Russians’ support for
liberal democracy.
My research addresses Kotkin's work by developing a supplementary explanation
for the failure of liberal democracy to take root in post-Soviet Russia. While the
particular institutions of the fledgling government — in particular the strong executive —
did leave Russia vulnerable to illiberal governance, the impact of Russia's socioeconomic structure should not be neglected. In this respect, my thesis is more aligned
with Hahn's argument that the lack of social mobilization during the fall of the Soviet
Union is responsible for the atrophied nature of Russian democracy today. This thesis

14

goes further however by suggesting that the lack of an independent middle class in
particular bears special responsibility for the failure of democracy to mature in Russia.
Regarding Sakwa's position, while Russia holds allegedly democratic elections I contend
that the overall system of governance is illiberal at best and authoritarian at worst. I also
heavily incorporate Sakwa's argument for a segment of the middle class dependent on the
state to provide an explanation of why many Russians who self-identify as middle class
nevertheless fail to support liberal democratic government.
Contribution of Research

Building off of public polling data that shows most Russians prefer economic
security to good democracy, I hypothesize that a key reason for the lack of democracy is
the presence of an economically insecure, lower income population that significantly
outnumbers the independent middle class. Much has been made among academics and
politicians of Russians' desire for stability. Some have even gone as far as to suggest that
the Russian mentality is predisposed to authoritarian rule.** However, this kind of
analysis overlooks the impact of socio-economic class on the extent to which Russians
are willing to exchange civil freedoms for guarantees of economic security. My research
seeks to fill that gap.
My research is further differentiated from previous scholarship by its analysis of a

‘4
‘S

Pew Research Center, “Public Opinion in Russia,” 2012
Peter Baker and Susan Glasser. Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution.
New York: Scribner, 2005; Cheng Chen and Rudra Sil. “State Legitimacy and the (In)significance of
Democracy in Post-Communist Russia.” Europe Asia Studies 56, no. 3, [2004] 347-368; Aleksandr
Lukin, “Electoral Democracy or Electoral Clanism? Russian Democratization and Theories of
Transition,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 7, no. 1 [Winter 1999]: 9495
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combination of socio-economic and political factors to explain the political development
of Russia since perestroika. While other scholars have looked at the existence of a middle
class in Russia — and many more have commented on the political evolution of Russia
through the administrations of Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin, Medvedev, and now Putin again

— there is a dearth of academic research examining the relationship between these two
epiphenomena. That is not to say that my research seeks to prove that the middle class is

the sole cause of liberal democracy. Rather, by showing how the lack of growth in the
middle class has historically corresponded with a failure to develop liberal political
practices, combined with polling data showing higher levels of support for liberal

democracy among middle class Russians, my research adds another piece to the puzzle of
understanding the many diverse factors which encourage or inhibit democratization.

16

Out of the Shadows: Russia's Proto-Middle Class under Gorbachev
“Democracy is the wholesome and pure air without which a socialist public organization cannot
live a full-blooded life ~ Mikhail Gorbachev'

This chapter examines the emergence of a proto-middle class after the initiation of
perestroika by Gorbachev and the progression of this proto-middle class until the
subsequent Yeltsin government. The absence of polling data broken down by economic
class during this time period means there is no method of determining the level of support
for democracy among the middle class relative to other social strata. This leaves a
comparison of the state of the middle class and democracy during this time period as the
best available method for supporting a link between the two. While the emerging protomiddle class composed primarily of technocrats represented a potential force for social
and political change, that potential was never recognized. Instead, the lack of regulation
surrounding perestroika and privatization was exploited by existing elites and
opportunistic bureaucrats to legitimize their power. The resulting concentration of wealth
among a small stratum of Russian society left the nascent middle class without the
necessary economic base of support and as a consequence left the country vulnerable to
an illiberal relapse.
Introduction

For most of the 20" Century, Russia as we know it was a member of the USSR.
'

Mikhail Gorbachev, “Address to the 27" Party Congress,” given at the 27" Congress of the Communist
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During this period, the Soviet system was conducive to neither democracy nor a middle
class. As a result, until the perestroika reforms of Gorbachev authorized individual labor
activities in 1986 and the formation of private economic cooperatives in 1987,’ there was
no real middle class bridging the divide between the nomenklatura elites and-society at
large. Throughout the Soviet period, there was heavy emphasis on the idea that the
Communist Party represented the unified interests of the people.’ Such an ideology
required the labeling of dissent as un-patriotic and resulted invariably with harsh
repression.’ This principle of conformity extended also to civic organizations such as
trade unions and even youth groups like the Pioneers — Russian boy scouts. Such a
perspective naturally stifled public displays of political or societal pluralism.
In response to Gorbachev's reform of Soviet society, an entrepreneurial class

began to emerge. This class — based primarily around technocrats as well as small
businesses or cooperatives because the State still controlled the major industrial interest —
can be thought of in terms of a proto-middle class.’ Perestroika also transformed nonmiddle class Russians. Soviet political elites* became increasingly concerned as they
observed the collapse of European communist governments in 1989.’ The progress of
2

3

David Hoffman. The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia. [US: Public Affairs, 2011], 38-39
Glenn Curtis, “Social Structure and Social Stratification,” Russia: A Country Study Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1996. To be clear, people here refers to the working class proletariat. The
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Robert Sharlet, “Prague 1968: The Aftermath,” /nternational Journal 33, no. 4 [1978]: 763
Paul Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives,

{Cambridge University Press, 2004], 218-20; Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy:
An Economic History of the USSR from 1945, (London: Longman, 2003]
Because of the fusion of the state and the economy, it could be argued that the distinction of “political”
elites (versus economic elites) lacks real meaning since the nomenklatura typically had significant
economic influence as well. However, I feel drawing this distinction now will prove useful when

moving forward to discuss the relationship between economic and political elites during the 1990s
Fredo Arias-King, “Soviet Domestic Politics and Collapse of the Outer Empire, 1989,”

18

perestroika provoked two very different reactions within these social groups. While the
proto-middle class was among the social groups supportive of continuing reform in an
open, democratic manner’, political elites were divided between those who categorically
opposed radical reform and those who sought to use the reform movement to their own

advantage.”
When the dust settled on the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
the Russian Federation, what remained was a still--weak middle class facing elites who

had re-written the rules of the game and were prepared to take full advantage of the new
system. The so called “triumph” of democracy was actually a power play by elites who
stood to gain economically and politically.'° Also in the mix were Russians who simply
wanted stability — both economic and political — and were willing to support whatever
leader was willing to promise them that stability."
While the new Russian constitution formally established civil rights, elections,
and democratic institutions, a large divide would soon emerge between these promises
and the realities of the situation. There was no longer an official political party, but that
did not mean political power had been equitably diffused throughout society. Without a
middle class to defend them, these democratic institutions remained vulnerable to the
Demokratizatsiya: Post-Soviet Journal of Democratization 7, no. 2 [1999]: 289
Tatiana Zaslavskaia, "O strategii sotsial'nogo upravlenia perestroikoi". In Jnoge nye dano edited by Yuri
Afanasyev, [Moscow: Progress, 1988]
Perhaps the two clearest examples from opposite sides of the divide are Yegor Ligachey, representing
the conservative wing of the CPSU, and Boris Yeltsin, representing the opportunistic reformer
Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 107
James Gallagher, “Battered Russians Long for Stability,” Chicago Tribune, March 14, 1993,
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power politics of demagogues like Yeltsin and the oligarchs. The end result was a
political system more evocative of the country's Soviet or Tsarist legacy than a true

liberal democracy."
The Soviet Union and a Proto-Middle Class
When Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee, Soviet

society could be broken down into three categories: elites, blue collar workers and
peasants, and the more liberal middle stratum." Elites in this context refers to not just the

political elites of the Communist party —- commonly known as the nomenklatura — but
also managers of state factories and other enterprises. While such elites would almost
certainly have been party members, they were more administrators of policy than central
policy makers. In addition to prototypical members of the creative intelligentsia, the
middle stratum contained technocrats also known as the technical. intelligentsia —
economists, engineers, and sociologists for example — who operated within the state
sphere but possessed independently valuable education and skills.'* Regarding the general
priorities of the various social classes, Zaslavskaia argues that the elites as. might be
expected were concerned with consolidating their power while workers and peasants

were predominantly interested in matters of basic economic survival and living
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and East European Research, December 14, 2010,
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http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2010_825-

conditions.'® Although the intelligentsia and technocrats represented a sort of societal
median, based on the previous definition they cannot be considered a true middle class
for two reasons: their lack of participation in civil society, and their continued connection
to state institutions of power.
The influence of the technocrats is especially relevant to understanding the
emergence of a so-called middle class during the late Soviet Union.'* As noted before, the
initial impetus for reform in the late Soviet period did not originate in the working
classes.'’ Instead, this openness to reform came from technocrats who can be
distinguished from bureaucrats based on their personal background and professional
purpose. While both technocrats and bureaucrats were subservient to the state,

bureaucrats for the purposes of this paper are rank and file government workers who may
be educated but who are not being utilized for their technical expertise.'* Technocrats on
the other hand hold university degrees in economics, engineering or some other applied
science and typically have work experience outside of the state organs.’” These differing
backgrounds can lead to differing roles as bureaucrats may be tasked with simply

'"

Zaslavskaia, “Contemporary Russian Society,” 2006
By referring to the middle class here as a “so-called” middle class, I am attempting to underline the
existing debate over whether it did in fact represent a true middle class or a proto-middle class, or even
no distinct class at all
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pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed April 13, 2013); While this may seem an unnecessary point, since |
refer to middle-class based democracy as democracy from below I felt it necessary to clarify that this

grassroots democracy is not generated by just any of the lower social strata
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implementing the official government policy” while technocrats are more involved in
coming up with policy solutions which can create a positive outcome for society.”!
A relatively high level of income allowed individuals of the middle stratum to
consider political issues on a more ideological basis rather than purely as a series of
pragmatic economic questions.” Not only were technocrats empowered by their
relatively high income level, their access to computers, other communication technology,
and travel opportunities made them inherently more difficult to control than blue collar
workers.” Their openness to new ideas led members of the middle stratum to make

demands on the regime to improve their quality of life — access to information, travel, and
consumer goods for example — based on their observations and experiences of other
countries,"* While these demands were not explicitly political to begin with, their very
existence represented a significant step in the development of civil society.
At the same time, prior to the legalization of individual economic activity the state
maintained a total monopoly over legitimate economic production. Private co-operatives
— economic endeavors organized by groups of private citizens — were legalized in May
1987 opening a window for private ownership as Russians opened their own cooperatives
in industries as diverse as electronics repair and agriculture.”* However, by 1991 the total
output of private cooperatives represented only 0.8% percent of total production in the
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USSR.” The natural consequence was that all members of society — even middle income
citizens — were dependent on the state for their continuing economic well being.” To a
significant extent, dependence on the state reduced motivation for public opposition to
the continuing existence of the state itself. As Thomas Remington states in his book, The
Politics of Inequality in Russia, “{a] property-less bourgeoisie may be more likely to seek
the state's protection than demanding political rights as guarantees of property rights.”
The existence of a true, independent middle class was thus highly unlikely under the
Soviet system. At best, we can say that a proto-middle class existed, which set the stage
for the emergence of a new middle class after the fall of the USSR.
Repression of Democracy and Civil Society
The relationship between the state and society in Soviet Russia prior to Gorbachev
repressed the emergence of democracy or civil society to a substantial degree. The
rimary reason for this was the one-party system of authoritarian rule. As Huntington has
observed, single-party authoritarian regimes often fuse the ideology of the party to the

ideology of the state.” The result is that attacks on the party - whether on ideological or
merely practical grounds — are viewed and treated as treason against the state.*” In the
case of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the party presented itself as the very
©

T. Kuznetsova, “Cooperatives: The Tactic Determines the Practice,” Problems of Economics 32, no. 8
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Ta be fair, all citizens of a state are to some extent dependent on it for their economic well being. A
sound fiscal policy and fair property law are two examples of this phenomenon. However, such
dependence is different than a direct dependence on the state for continued employment which was the
case in the centrally planned and controlled economy of the Soviet Union.
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embodiment of the state.*' As such, any action that created fissures in the facade of this

united front was severely dealt with.”
It is important to note, however, that such a state of affairs did not completely
eliminate dissent against the governing regime. In fact, at various times during the Soviet
period a robust industry of samizdat — illegal, self published materials — flourished, often
devoting its attention to criticisms of state and society. However, the illegal nature of
such activities inhibited the development of a public dialogue regarding politics,
economics, and society. Only after Gorbachev initiated his policy of g/asnost and
Russians began to accept that it was not merely a ploy to identify enemies of the regime
did this type of discussion move out into the open. Understanding this point is critica!
because this type of pluralistic, public political dialogue is a key symptom of a healthy
middle class that is actively engaged in the political and social development of the
country. Its absence then supports the contention that Russia at the beginning of
Gorbachev's term lacked a true middle class.
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Soviet Civil Society

As noted above, true civil society was not possible during most of the Soviet
period duc to the pervasiveness of state influence over all aspects of society.” The few
non-officia! associations and activities — for example the Helsinki Watch Group, the
Committee for Human Rights, the Russian Social Fund for Aid to Political Prisoners and

Their Families, and the Working Group for the Defense of Labor and of Social and
Economic Rights — which did manage to exist during the Soviet period were largely
forced underground by the state due to the arrests of their membership.*° Professional
groups tended te be co-opted by the state*® leaving independent social organizations few
and tar between until Gorbachev's economic reforms were enacted.*’ Nevertheless, an

analysis of the late Soviet period shows the existence of something resembling civil
society — previously. defined as a network of voluntary associations recognized within a
legal framework.” The prominent scholar of the Soviet Union Moshe Lewin postulates
that these independent social networks even influenced the behavior of government

bureaucrats.”
In some respects, Lewin seems to be arguing for the existence of a middle class in
Soviet Russia which was pushing for systemic reform; but while social pressure certainly
*4
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had some effect on Gorbachev's perestroika the development and influence ofa true
middle class should not be overstated. At the most basic level, these professionals were

still dependent almost exclusively on the government for their economic well-being.”
Such a state of affairs was practically inescapable in a country with an economy so

closely controlled by the party-state apparatus. Additionally, while a nascent civil society
may have responded to Gorbachev's calls for g/asnost by supporting reform of economic

and political structures, there is little doubt that the actual impetus for these reforms
originated from within Gorbachev's circle.*! The middle class had not sufficiently
developed its economic independence and collective identity to effect a liberalizing
change. So while Soviet intelligentsia and technocrats may have represented a protomiddle class in their level of income and education and even their support for reforms of
the Soviet system from within, their failure to form a civil society including Gill and
Markwick's relevant third order groups prior to 1991 means that they cannot be

considered a true middle class.”
Economic Reforms and Emerging Entrepreneurs
The economic landscape of the Soviet system was significantly altered in late
1986-1987 with the legalization of individual labor activity and private cooperatives.”
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The economic and social impact of these changes were the subject of Steven Kotkin's
research in Magnitogorsk — a mid-sized industrial center in the Urals built around a pig
iron and rolled steel factory. The impact of reforms in Magnitogorsk cannot simply be
extrapolated to other urban or rural areas of Russia, but Kotkin's work is an in depth lock
at how a particular community of Russians felt and reacted to Gorbachev's initial

economic reforms providing a real world case study of the broader theoretica! arguments
surrounding privatization. While there were still many limits on the extent of these
activities — producers were still largely dependent on the state for the necessary raw
materials* — these policies were still a rather significant departure from the previous

strategy which relied entirely on central planning. The cooperative law allowed private
citizens to form businesses as diverse as clothing manufacturing and electronics repair.
The impacts of these economic developments on Russian civil society were
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, workers engaging in the cooperatives spoke of
the freedom and dignity they felt by controlling their own economic vocation.” In the
aftermath of these reforms, Russians in Magnitogorsk were inspired to create a Society
for the Defense of Consumers! Rights although whether this society resulted in any real
positive change was unclear.** On the other hand, the new producers were still very much
dependent on the state — a fact of which they themselves were constantly aware.’ This
dependence was the result of the absence of independent suppliers of raw material as well
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* Tbid., 22
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as a substantial but unpredictable regime of regulation and taxation.’ Additionally, only a
small portion of Russians engaged in such economic activities. The vast majority
continued to rely entirely on state administrated industries for their livelihood.*' In the
view of some Russians, this dependence created a vulnerability to manipulation of

citizens by authorities. As one resident of Magnitogorsk put it, “[e]verything is allocated
by them according to their lists, with which they rule over our lives”.* This lack of
independence inhibited the ability of the average worker to behave as a truly autonomous
political actor — a key component of a middle class identity.

While the relationship is far from clear or linear, based on the experience of
Magnitogorsk there does appear to be some kind of link between the emergence of small,
relatively independent businesses and some semblance of civil society, While the actual
participants in the cooperatives seemed to most acutely feel this new freedom, it also
extended to wider grassroots efforts for consumer protection. Nonetheless, this

independent economic activity had significant restrictions which limited its ability to
create truly autonomous actors, and large segments of the population remained dependent
on the state. It would be premature to label the result of these reforms a true middle class,

but the development still represents a significant departure from the Soviet era to that
point.
Economic Chaos
The proto-middle class — composed of both the creative and technical
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intelligentsia as well as some members of private cooperatives — was not the only social
strata which grew during this time period. During the later Gorbachev years, many elites
were able to amass substantial fortunes which could then be used to obtain political

power and influence.* The lack of strictly enforced rules during the economic reform
process meant that some reforms failed to achieve their goal of buiiding up legitimate
private businesses. There was a good deal of plundering especially by the old elites of the
Soviet system who saw in perestroika a chance to expropriate state property to
themselves. These 'entrepreneurs' — who later became known as the oligarchs — began to
emerge during the late Gorbachev era, but the trend continued throughout the 1990s. One
of the prime examples of these new oligarchs was Boris Berezovskii. Between 1989 and

1992, he made $250 million USD in profits by purchasing Lada cars from the state's
manufacturing plant at reduced prices and then selling them on the open market.**

Such manipulation of the reform process is significant for two reasons. First, it
created a negative association in the minds of many Russians between democracy and
lawlessness.*° This negative association was personally observed by the author repeatedly
when reading news articles while living in Russia in the spring of 2012. Even then, the
specter of the chaos of the 1990s was still powerful enough to be used as an effective
political tool to justify a maintenance of the illiberal status quo. Second, the consolidation
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of wealth among the elites arguably stunted the development ofa broad middle class by
denying it the proper economic base.*’ Instead of giving all Russians the opportunity to

better themselves through the emergence of private industry, perestroika increased the
stratification of society between elites and non-elites. Both the desire and ability of
Russians: to demand liberal-democracy decreased as a result of this economic plundering
during the early years of the 1990s.
Fragile Hope
While far from perfect, Russia by 1993 was showing signs of democratization
having established a government with an executive elected by the people in free and fair
elections as well as a constitution which codified the rights of citizens to certain liberal
freedoms.” On paper at least, democracy had triumphed over authoritarianism. Freed
from the confines of the Soviet state and empowered by the economic reforms, the
middle class had begun to create something close to a real civil society. 45% of the
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which were still active in Russia
in 2006 came into being between 1987 and 1991. However, the influence ef such
grassroots movements could not compete with the power wielded by the oligarchic elite.
7
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This meant that the new Russian democracy remained vulnerable to relapses which
unfortunately were soon to come.

Conclusion

The eight years between Gorbachev's elevation to General Secretary of the

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 and the
ratification of the Russian Constitution in 1993 tell the story of a tentatively rising middle
class. Beginning with the proto-middle class technocrats and intelligentsia, by the end of
this period, a small but genuine middle class can be said to exist based on the increase in
economic well-being among the middle stratum of society and the emergence of nascent
organs of civil society. However, the middle class was not the only rising force at this
time. Economic elites - many members of the old Communist nomenklatura — had used

the disorder surrounding perestroika to entrench their own economic and political power.
A significant majority of the population also remained concerned primarily with survival
rather than political abstractions.°! As a result, without a more substantial middle class the
democracy which had been only recently won remained unconsolidated.
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Unrealized Hope: The Regression of Demo
cracy under Boris Yeltsin
We need millions of owners, not
hundreds of millionaires” ~ Boris Yeltsin'

This chapter examines the connection
between the Russian middle class and

democracy during the tenure of Boris Yeltsin as president. Pollin
g data during this period
supports the contention that middle class Russians are more likely
to support liberal

democracy while an analysis of the historical narrative during this time frame
provides
evidence consistent with the claim that a weak middle class left the politic
al system open
to manipulation by an oligarchic elite. Although the holding of legislative and
presidential elections under Yeltsin might suggest a truly democratic system of
government, a closer examination reveals that what appeared to be the democratic
process was merely infighting among elites over who would control the power of the
illiberal government rather than a broader disagreement over the existence of the illiberal
regime itself.
Introduction The fall of the Soviet Union shook of the economic landscape in Russia. Instead
of a mostly state run economy, there was a push for rapid privatization according to the
model of Wester capitalism.? One method of accomplishing this was the issuance of

stock options for previously state owned companies to Russian citizens.’ This was
'
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designed to ensure an equitable spread of the econemic resources. In practice however
most of these stocks became concentrated in the hands of a relatively small circle of well

off clites.* In many cases these were the same individuals who held power under the
communist government.’ Instead of creating a vibrant middle class with an investment in
the country’s economic development, privatization created a class of oligarchs concerned
primarily with the growth of their own interests.
Further setting back the middle class was the economic chaos which ensucd for
much of the decade. Many Russians were sold worthless stock options by opportunistic
businessmen resulting in substantial losses.° At the same time, there was massive
inflation verging on hyper-inflation’ which served to wipe out any accumulated life
savings. Both of these factors severely hampered the development of any real sort of
middle-class. Many Russians were pushed to the financial brink evento the point of food
insecurity.’ This development was important for two reasons. First, it linked the idea of
Western style government with the experience of impoverishment in the minds of some
Russians.’ Second, instead of a balanced society, wealth was highly concentrated in the
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upper echeions.'? As we will sec, this uprooted the country's best hope for a stable, liberal
democracy.

During this same time period, the Russian government was composed primarily of
democratic institutions but failed to promote a liberal democracy. To begin with, there
were serious questions regarding the legitimacy of elections. After the 1995
parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections for example, there was a widespread belief
among observers that election results had been manipulated to reduce the share of the
vote won by candidates from the Communist Party.'' Even those close to Yeltsin have

claimed that for the good of the country the Communists could not be allowed to receive
a significant portion of the votes no matter what it took to ensure that.'? The weakness of
the government meant that other liberal ideals — freedom of the press and speech for

xample — faced less of an attack but nonetheless failed to take root in Russian society as
ideas considered by most Russians as important.'*
Through most of the 90s. and into the beginning of Putin's first term, the oligarchs
saw the government as a means of settling disputes between conflicting factions. Overall,
the government as an independent actor remained very weak relying on the support of

these networks of elites.'* While public disagreements over government policy during this
time period could mistakenly be considered proof of a robust pluralistic society, in reality
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http://articies.sun-sentinel.com/| 996-07-05/news/9607040529_1_gennady-zyuganov-russian-

communist-party-yeltsin-camp (accessed April 13, 2013)

"=

David Hoffman, The Oligarchs, 345-347
Yuri Federov, “Democratization and Globalization”, 4-5

Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, 72

34

these spats were merely conflicts among elites over the exact distribution of power.’
Even when the government was criticized as heavy handed, the real complaint was not
the president's extensive authority but rather his use of that authority in an undesired

manner.*° The government was thus transformed into a tool of warring elites rather than a
democratic institution run by and for the general population.
Linking the Middle Class and Democracy
A link between the middle class and democracy during this time period can be
both measured directly and inferred indirectly from the results of public opinion polls.

From an indirect standpoint, polling data shows that middle class Russians were
significantly more likely to hold modemist rather than traditionalist values.'7 In this casc,
traditionalist views refers to support for a stronger government presence in society.'®
Moedernist values then align with a more liberal, democratic perspective. Admittedly, this
dataset does not specifically define modern values in terms of democracy. Also, it relies
on a purely economic understanding of the middle class rather than understanding it as a
social institution.'? However, the point nonetheless remains that there is a divide in vaiues

between raiddle income and lower income Russians.
The divide between middle income and lower income Russians is driven home

even more in polling data collected by the Russian Independent Institute of Social and
Nationalities Problems during the 1990s. Table 2.1 shows the results of a poll conducted
'S
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by the Russian Independent Institute of Social and Nationalities Problems (RIISNP) —
created in 1991 — in which respondents were asked to evaluate various elements of
democracy listed in the first column as either important or unimportant. The table then
breaks down respondents by column based on their income level with each column
subdivided into the percentage of respondents giving each respective answer.

Table 2.1: Russian Political Opinion under Yeltsin Divided by Income

Middle Income
Element of

Low -income strata

Below the poyerty line

Important | Unimportant | Important | Unimportant | Important | Unimportant

Democracy

Multiparty

31.8

42.9

25.9

51

20.9

56.1

28.8

39

33.3

33.)

35.5

|

|

System
Presence of
representative
organs of power

43.6

Freedom of

717

:

|
12.8

55.3

23.6

enterprise

Freedom of

40.9

-

85.7

5

76.9

|

31.1

10.7

662

|

195

|
|
66.7

Electivity of ail

68.2

18.5

50.4

31.8

37.8

|

40.9

63.7

16.5

618

|

-

government

|

bodies

|

|

Source: Russian Independent Institute of Social and Nationalities Problems (RITSNP), /9 95-2000 survey

data, referenced in Vladimir Petukhov and Andrei Ryabov, “Public Attitudes About Democracy.” In
Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform, edited by Michael
McFaul, Vladimir Petukhov, and Andrei Ryabov, 268-91, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
Intemationai Peace, 2004.

As Table 2.1 shows, support for liberal democratic values like multiparty
elections, freedom of enterprise and freedom of speech is noticeably higher among
36
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middle income Russians,”° This correlation is not sufficient to prove sole causality — i.e. it
does not prove that being in the middle class is the only factor behind some Russians

support fer democracy — but it nonetheless provides support for the idea that expanding
the segment of the population identified as middle class is favorable for the development

of liberal democracy in Russia. When combined with other public opinion data and

nistorical evidence, the result is a convincing if circumstantial argument.

Emerging Middle Class
The economic situation as it related to the development of the middle class during
this time period fluctuated between tolerable and inhospitable. Privatization was initially

formulated by Yeltsin's economic advisers as a means of giving all Russians a stake in the
future of their country.” However the reality fell far short of this noble goal. The process
of privatization was manipulated by the oligarchs with the end result that most of the

country's wealth had been concentrated among a small group of elites.” Instead of
creating millions of owners, the reforms created a handful of millionaires and billionaires.
This disparity is reflected in official economic data. As Gill and Markwick note, “[a]
1995 comparison of household money income in the USA and Russia...showed not only
that the top and bottom 20 per cent of Russian households had a larger share of income
%

Russian Independent Institute of Social and Nationalities Problems (RIISNP)}, 1995-2000 survey data,
referenced in Vladimir Petukhov and Andrei Ryabov, “Public Attitudes About Democracy.” In Benveen
Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform, edited by Michael McFaul,
Vladimir Petukhov, and Andrei Ryabov, 268-91, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2004. The data presented here are the results of nationwide scciological monitoring
of a representative sample of approximately 1,800-2,200 respondents in all economic-geographic
regions of Russia conducted by the Russian Independent Institute of Social and Nationalities Problems
(RIISNP) in 1995-2000.
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than in the USA, but that the three middle quintiles in Russia had a smaller share of
income than their US counterparts.”
The middle class during this time frame can be imagined in terms of small
business owners, low level entrepreneurs, the most qualified specialists, and technically
skilled employees”. The image of the middle class can be most starkly contrasted with
that of the oligarchs during this period. Middle class Russians — while relatively well off

— were in no position to live the extravagant lifestyles associated with the “New
Russians” of the period.
The oligarchs managed to accumulate a large percentage of the country's wealth
by using personal connections and business savvy to take advantages of the relatively
unregulated transfer of massive state holdings to the private secter. There were those
among Yeltsin's circle who were concerned about possible manipulation of the public
auctions of state firms, but in the end the belief that privatization — regardless of who
became the owner ~- was necessary won out.” Through various, occasionally
underhanded means, a few individuals managed to acquire massive amounts of auction
vouchers which could be used to purchase shares in state companies.”° In many cases,
these acquisitions were made at the expense of Russians poised to become members of
the middle class.’’ In the end, the middle class that emerged was far smaller than the
%

Gill and Markwick, Russia's Stillborn Democracy, 240. At the same time, the middle class only
accounted for 25% of total economic output. A much lower number than their western counterparts (Gill
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reformers within the Gorbachev and Yeltsin administrations had initially hoped.

The result of this disparity was a social structure which resembled a pyramid. At
the apex were a small group of individuals controlling vast amounts of wealth while the
majority of the population was left at the bottom. Such a distribution of wealth dried up
the financial base necessary to support a robust, independent middle class.2* In the ideal
scenario for the middle class, income distribution would be similar to a flat diamond:
zelatively few individuals at the top and bottom with a large, robust middle section

creating and possessing the majority of the country's wealth.” The dysfunctional pyramid
social structure instead created an environment where elites manipulated the political as
well as economic process. Instead of a robust liberal democracy, power devolved to a
more authoritarian system of government influence by the few rather than the many.

In spite of these difficulties, the middle class. managed to. grow somewhat during
the early 1990s. As a result of economic liberalization, small and medium size businesses

began to appear, accounting for 12% of GDP and employing 20% of the workforce in
early 1998 according to official figures.” According to noted Russian sociologist Tatiana
Zasiavskaia, the middle stratum — defined as small and medium scale entrepreneurs,

managers in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing spheres, specialists, and elite
workers — made up 24% of Russian society between 1993 and 1995.*! There is no precise
>
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measurement of how much of this middle stratum was truly middle class in terms of
income level, education, and self-identification. However, Zaslavskaia's research

indicates that a middle class existed at least to some degree even if it remained less than a

third of the size of the lower strata of Russian society.”
The weakness of the middle class following privatization was compounded by the
financial crisis of August 1998, which saw massive inflation wiping out the savings of
most middle class Russians. * Whether they had kept their money in banks or out of
banks, the hyperinflation of the late 90s meant that many Russians struggled to afford
even basic necessilies.** This situation represented a cruel reversal of the Soviet period in
which citizens had plenty of money, but nothing on which to spend it.’ In sum, while the
situation was not hopeless, the outlook remained bleak for the development of a strong
middle class,
Based on the state of the middle class, one would expect to observe
correspondingly weak democracy. In fact, the flaws of Russian democracy during this
period are too numerous to cover exhaustively. Colton and McFaul list a few worth
noting included government decision making that was often closed to the public and
wrapped in layers of confidentiality and secrecy, massive pressure on the media by the
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Russian government and quasi-private interests to conform to officially

approved viewpoints, and the disproportionate use of force to suppress
opposition—for example, during the 1993 constitutional crisis and in the two grisly
wars in Chechnya.’® The shortcomings of Russian democracy were also exacerbated by
the country's unbalanced socio-economic structure. From the beginning of the

privatization process, the extreme concentration of wealth among the oligarchs gave them
tremendous political power.” Of course, this power had to be maintained — a goal
threatened by the potentially unpredictable nature of a democratic system of government.
As aresult, the oligarchs often resorted to manipulation of the politica! process to protect
their economic interests.
Yeltsin's Clans

Understanding the flaws of Russian “democracy” during this period is virtually
impossible without a discussion of the oligarchs surrounding Yeltsin's administration. In
many sources, they are referred to simply as “the family’”* - Gill and Markwick refer to
some of them as the Sverdlovsk Mafia after the region of Russia in which Yeltsin had
many powerful connections.”? These oligarchs — also called “New Russians” drawing a
link between Gorbachev's privatization and Lenin's New Economic Policy of the 1920s —
accumulated vast personal fortunes as a result of personal connections and lax

Timothy Celton and Michael McFaul. “Are Russians Undemocratic?” Russian and Eurasian Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 20, [June 2001}: 3-4
Hoffman's The Oligarchs is again an invaluable resource especially his chapter entitled “The Embrace
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government regulations during the privatization period.’ Some were former factory
managers who had colluded with local bureaucrats to maintain a majority ownership
through the voucher sell-offs, other were mid-level bureaucrats who saw the winds of

change coming in Gorbachev and decided to make the best of the situation.
Commentators have described the sell-off of state property as the legitimization of the

previous power structure through the appearance of law and order.’! In other words, the
top down structure of power in Russia did not change hands, it merely changed

appearances.
Regardless of the exact means by which their wealth was obtained, New Russians
prioritized the maintenance of their newly acquired fortunes. Despite the outward show
of law and order in the 1991 and 1993 elections, it soon became clear that the most secure
means of maintaining their wealth was through personal connections — known as blat.”
Among the most effective personal connections were thosc tied to the nascent Russian
state. While the criminal world arguably exerted a great deal of influence during this time

period as well,” the state had the ability to grant an air of legitimacy as weil as a strong
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coercive force. This became especially clear during the 1996 presidential election. Facing
a reasonably strong challenge from the Communist candidate, Gennady Zyuganovy,
Yeltsin appeared quite vulnerable. Realizing that a return to Communist government
represented a threat to their new wealth — most Russians resented the newly wealthy,
regarding their gains as ill-gotten

—a group of oligarchs decided to coordinate their

resources to ensure Yeltsin's re-election.
Free and Fair Elections?
Perhaps the most central component of democracy is the holding of elections
which are not only competitive but free and fair.*° As Elklit and Svenson note, there are

no elections which can be considered completely fair.“° However, it would be difficult to
find any means of calling the results of the 1996 elections anything but heavily
manipulated. This judgment is based not so much on actual election-day irregularities —
ballot stuffing or voter coercion — as to pre-election actions which significantly skewed
the playing field in favor to the incumbent President Boris Yeltsin.
A ceriain advantage is generally expected for an incumbent candidate even in
democratic elections.*’? Whether through name recognition, expericnce, or some other
factor, a current officeholder enjoys a significant edge over the challenger. This
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advantage oniy extends so far, however, before it begins to threaten the fairness of the
clection process itself. For example, in the course of their term, an elected official will
undoubtedly make various official trips which are often structured to highlight leadership
capabilities or other desirable traits. While that may confer an advantage to the
incumbent, it is still an accepted part of the democratic process. However, if the
officcholder were to utilize state resources for his own election campaign — forcing
government employees to work for the campaign for example — that would cross the line
into unfairness.

In the case of Russia, the 1996 election was marked with an abuse of access to

state resources by Boris Yeltsin as well as a manipulation of pre-election coverage in the
nationa! media to increase public support for Yeltsin. Over the course of the election
campaign, Yeltsin drew around $11 billion out of state funds for his own personal use.*
Such funds were not available to any of the other candidates in the race, so their use
represents a clear breach of common standards of fairness. During the election, Yeltsin
also made bargain with a group of billionaires headed by Boris Berezovskii.” The
oligarchs, a group that included owners of the country's leading media congiomerates,

used their vast resources to skew pre-election coverage dramaticaily in Yeitsin's favor.”
Tactics used included paying for favorable newspaper articles, unsigned advertising, and
falsified documents.*’ As many international election observers have noted, such a preelection advantage, which goes far beyond the usual incumbents’ advantage, is just as
AS
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damaging to the faimess of an election as actual vote rigging on the day of the polls.”

Yeltsin for his part used his presidential powers which, under the !993 constitulion were
quite extensive and personal influence to promote a business environment favorable to

the oligarchs' interests.
Despite the show of elections and democratic process, it would be difficult to
consider this level of collusion between government and business an example of liberal
democracy. The simple existence of such schemes does not preclude the operation of

democracy in Russia. Even a mature democracy such as the United States can struggle
with the influence of corruption on its electoral system. However, when such a scheme

is blatantly carried out with the legal system either unwilling or unable to sanction its
perpetrators, significant doubt is cast on the health or even existence of liberal democracy
in the country.
The root cause of this arrangement can be blamed on many things including the
concentration of power in the executive branch, the overall weakness of the state
apparatus. However, as least part of the root cause can be traced to the weakness of the
middle class in Russia during the mid to late 1990s. Without a substantial middle class,

most of the country's wealth became concentrated among a few economic elites.** That is

34

Thomes Carothers, “The Observers Observed,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 {1997}: 22-23
”
Thomas Graham, “From Oligarchy to Oligarchy: The Structure of Russia’s Ruling Elite,
Demoikratizatsiva: Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 7, no, 3 [19991: 328-336. It 1s important to
note that while the oligarchs united to support Yeltsin's candidacy, they are not a monolithic entity with
a single commen interest. There was a great deal of in-fighting among them, which Yeltsin occasionally
intervened in. Nonetheless, his continued tolerance of the oligarchs and their political influence stands
in marked centrasi to the more firm stance adopted by his successor Vladimir Putin.
CBS News, “Blagojevich Gets 14 Years in Prison,” December 7, 2011, http:/Avww.cbsnews.conv/&301250

_162-57338646/blagojevich-gets-14-vears-in-prisan/ (accessed April 11, 2013)

Glenn Curtis, “Social Structure and Social Stratification,” 1996

45

not to say that income inequality does not exist in countries with a middle class — it does.
There is no way of knowing for certain whether a robust middle class could have

prevented such un-democratic actions or held Yeltsin and others accountable after the
fact. However, as power is diffused across a wider population base — represented by the
middle class — rather than concentrated among a few elites, the ability of average citizens
to hold government officials accountable would logically seem to increase. Without such

a middle class though, there is virtually no check on the power of elites except for other
elites. Elections and the political process in such a scenario become part ofa chess game
among the powerful few rather than tools of democratic accountability. The political

involvement of the oligarchs in Russian politics seems to bear out this point.
Perceptions of Democracy

The absence of meaningful democracy during this time period did not go
unnoticed by Russians. Table 2.2 presents the results of a multi-year study by the Russian
Independent Institute of Social and Nationalities Problems. The first column lists the
statement respondents were given with the responses broken up by column into the
percentage of respondents who agreed with the statement and the percentage who
disagreed with it. Each column ts further subdivided by year to show a long term
comparison of attitudes between 1995 and 2000.
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Table 2.2: Russian Political Attitudes 1995-2000.
Opinion

Agree

|

Democratic

procedures are a
facade
Democratic

56

51

47.8

17.9

13.6

|

indispensable

|

|
|

TF

procedures are

183

| Public Participation is

23.4

18.8

23.8

52.5

59.9

‘important

{|

"Ordinary Citizens

|

66.1

66.4

70.3

20

| have no role to play,

only politicians do
Source: Russian Independent Institute of Secial and Nationalities Problems (RIISNP), 1995-2000 survey

daia, referenced in Vladimir Petukhov and Andrei Ryaboy, “Public Attitudes About Democracy.” In
Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform, edited by Michael

McFaul, Vladimir Petukhov, and Andrei Ryabov, 268-91, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2004.

As Table 2.2 shows, during the latter half of the 1990s over 70% of Russians
consistently saw the democratic process as a sham.” Such results can hardly considered
surprising given the previously discussed manipulation that surrounded the 1996
election.*’ More significant perhaps is the 7% drop in respondents agreeing that
democratic procedures are indispensable bringing that number below a simple plurality of
the Russian populace.** Two explanations can be offered for this decline. First, as
Russians became resigned to facade democracy they simply became apathetic towards
genuine democracy. Alternatively, the decline could indicate that initial support for
6
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democracy was superficial or instrumental rather than genuine — based on some
expectation of the economic benefits of democracy for example rather than a belief in
democracy for democracy's sake. The first explanation holds some weight considering
the data showing low support for public participation in politics, but the second is more
relevant to discussions of the middle class and democracy. Because the percentage of
Russians belonging to the middle class was so low during this time frame — and dropped
even further after the financial crisis of 1998 — this data could support the conclusion that
any support for democracy outside of the middle class was primarily instrumental in
nature further emphasizing the importance of the middle class in building a stable, liberal
democracy.
Civil Society: An Inch Deep and a Mile Wide
If civil society is understood as any autonomous association of private citizens® that is associations which are distinct from the state — then numerically speaking civil
society during this period was extremely robust. Neighborhood associations, interest
groups, and political partics popped up rapidly in the now unregulated post-Soviet space.
By some counts, there were over 1,200 registered political parties in 1992.°' Most of
these civil associations including the political group Dem Rosstia — an amalgamation of
eighteen social movements and nine political parties that came together in October 1990
and disintegrated in early 1992— lasted a few years at most before dissolving.” As a
59
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resull, not a single party contesting the 1993 elections on its own list represented the
interests of the bourgeoisie.’ The main issue for these parties was a lack of roots in
society. Instead of arising naturally out of grassroots, citizen movements, these parties

were often created by a single individual or group of individuals secking to use them as a
vehicle to further their own interests.°* Arguably, this is one reason Yeltsin refused to
associate himself with any one party, portraying himself instead as the representative of
ail Russians.® A vibrant civil society is a supportive — if not a necessary — feature of
liberal democracy” As such, it is relevant to examine the reasons civil society has failed
to take a deep root in post-Soviet Russia.
The atrophied nature of civil society during 1990s cannot be blamed on a lack of
effort by the U.S. and other established democracies to encourage civic participation.
Between 1992 and 1998, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) alone

donated more than $92 million USD on civic initiatives and support for NGOs.” In their
book, Russia's Stillborn Democracy. From Gorbachev to Yeltsin, Graeme Gill and Roger

Markwick point the finger at the economic climate in Russia during much of the 1990s.
The economic turmoil following shock therapy as well as the economic crisis of 1998
relegated the working class to little more than disempowered bystanders by denying them
®
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any sort of economic base of support.” Meanwhile, the middle class — which Gill and
Markwick agree provides a solid center for sustainable, liberal democracy — remained
substantially undersized in relation to their Western counterparts.” It is intriguing that the

period marked by a weak civil society coincides with perhaps the low-point of the middle
class in modem Russia. Such proof is purely circumstantial, but nonetheless provides a
measure of support for the hypothesis

that there is a link between the middle class and the

viability of liberal democracy as embodied in a healthy civil society in Russia.
Conclusion

While the 1990s could be considered one of the most free periods in Russian
history based on a superficial glance at the freedoms guaranteed in the 1993 Constitution

and electoral institutions, a closer look reveals a more complex picture. The concentration
of wealth among a few elites combined with several severe economic downturns
combined to weaken the country's emerging middle class and undermine support for true
liberal democracy. Instead of transforming into a liberal democracy — governed from the
bottom up — the widespread economic instability caused Russia to revert to a more topdown approach to government. While the outward appearance of the power structure may

have changed, its overall character remained essentially illiberal and un-democratic.
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Managed Democracy: Russia's Putin Experience
“Democracy is expendable, development is not” ~ Vledimir Lenin’

This chapter looks at the increased centralization of power by Vladimir Putin as
Putin's first
president against the backdrop of the development of the middle class during
to
two terms in power. The chapter draws upon polling data as well as economic data

support the hypothesized link between the middle class and democracy. Poiling data
class
continues to show societal support for democracy primarily comes from the middle
with lower income Russians preoccupied with economic concerns rather than political

ones. Examining the development of the middle class during this period shows that while
economic growth spurred an expansion of the middle class, the overall proportion of
Russians truly belonging to the middle class remained low especially by Western
standards, never exceeding 15% of the total population. The continued absence of a
middle class is reflected in the continuing trend of quasi-authoritarian governance by
Putin.
Introduction

The transition of political leadership from Yeltsin to Putin did not immediately
change the overall landscape of power. In the months after his inauguration as president,
Putin seemed to act tentatively as if afraid of offending the “family” of powerful
1

Viadizair Lenin, Quoted by Richard Sakwa, “The 2003-2004 Russian Elections and Prospects for

Democracy,” Europve-Asia Studies 57, no. 3 {2005}: 391
51

individuals which had coalesced around Yeltsin.’ That attitude changed drastically in a
very public manner when Putin began his prosecution of the individuals known as the
oligarchs. Among the first such instances were the investigation and subsequent criminal
indictments of the media holdings of Vladimir Gusinsky; the financial interests of

Vladimir Potanin; and Lukoil which was led by Vagit Alekperov.’ In each case, there has
been disagreement over whether the alleged crimes actually occurred or whether Putin
used prosecutions to consolidate his political control. Regardless, the message had been
sent that there was a new sheriff in town, and that the old way of doing business was no

longer welcome.
Following this initial show of strength, Putin continued working to increase the
effectiveness of the state. Among the reforms, Putin ended the practice of the popular
election of regional governors and instead gave the president the power to directly
appoint them.* Under Putin's watch, the system of election to the State Dura — Russia's
parliamentary body — was reformed to give increased advantages to established national
parties such as the pro-Kremlin United Russia.* While Putin heralded these moves as
necessary to establish the “dictatorship of law,” in practice these changes had the effect

oe

of centralizing power in the federal government — specifically in the office of the

>
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htt (accessed April 13, 2013); United
Press International, “Raids on Russian Businesses Intensify,” July 13, 2000,
http://archive.newsmax.cony/articles/?a=2000/7/12/203152 (accessed October 12, 2012)
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Europe, December 13, 2004, http:/www.rferl.org/content/article/1056377.
html (accessed April 11,
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president.” Other assaults on democracy can be seen in the
conduct of election and
government attacks on media and societal figures who insisted on critic
izing the
administration.* After the 2003 parliamentary elections for example, observers from the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stated that the results

exhibited a “regression of democratization.”
On the economic front, Russia experienced tremendous economic growth during
this time period — averaging 7% growth from 1999-2007." This growth did not translate
to a growth in democratic values or political liberalism. One of the factors that can be

blamed for this lack of support for liberal democracy is the continuing struggle of the
independent middle class. In large part, the economic growth was driven by skyrocketing
oil prices rather than an increase in small and medium sized businesses.'! Additionally,

Putin used the expansion of the state burcaucracy to co-opt many individuals who might
otherwise be considered members of the middle class. From 2004-2005 the number of
Russians employed as bureaucrats rose 11.8 percent to 1.46 million.” At that level, the

ratio of bureaucrats to Russian citizens was | to every 100 — the same level as during the
Soviet period.'* Because bureaucrats only served at the pleasure of other government
’

F. Joseph Dresen, “Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia,” Wilson Center, 2008,
http://www. wilsoncenter.org/publication/vladimir-putin-and-the-rule-law-russia (accessed April 11,

2013)
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officials, they were hardly more inclined to chall
enge the government by supporting

democratic reforms than Soviet bureaucrats four decades earlier."4

Outside of this median income stratum, opinion polls continued to show Russians
gs indifferent towards democracy and strongly prioritizing economic stability.'* A likely
cause for such opinions was widespread economic insecurity and a deep seated fear that

any sort of political transformation would take the country back into the dark years of the
1990s.'° This mindset meant that there was little public Opposition to Putin's
centralization of power as long as economic worries remained eased.'” While the
financial crisis of 2008 would raise tensions, even then the lack of a middle class meant
most complaints were economic in nature rather than concerned with civil rights and

freedoms.

Changing of the Guard
If the 1990s represented a period of nondemocratic governance caused by the

weakness of the state, the period from 2000 — 2007 represents a complete reversal of the
situation. Having observed the failings of the Russian state under Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin

came to power and quickly set about consolidating the power of the central government —
especially the executive.'* Putin's term began with many questions surrounding how he
would relate to the oligarchs referred to as Yeltsin's “family.”"° At first, Putin appeared to
'*

Thid., 325
Pew Research Center, "The Giovai Middle Class",
Global Attitudes Project, 2009,
http://www.pewelobal.org/2009/02/12/the-global-middle-class/ (accessed April 13, 2013)
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represent a continuation of the Yeltsin years, but it soon became apparent that he would
pe far more assertive in regards to the influence of wealthy Russians in politics. Putin
pegan bis political reorganization by opening legal investigations against Vladimir
Gusinsky, Vladimir Potanin, Vagit Alekperov, and Boris Berezovskii among others.2°
As the previous chapter showed, much of the oligarchs' wealth was obtained
through questionably legal means at best — a situation that was made possible by the
weakness of the state in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse and the eagerness of
Yeltsin to privatize Russia at all costs.”1 While Berezovskii, Gusinsky, Khodorkovsky and
other “New Russians” had legitimate skeletons in their closet, a closer examination of the

situation reveals that the campaign to single them out as the face of corruption in Russia
was almost certainly based on political rather than legal grounds. Putin held a special
meeting with the leading oligarchs in February of 2000 — shortly after assuming to
presidency — where he informed them that the rules of the game were changing. No
longer would oligarchs be able to control state policy for their own gain.” This meeting

was followed by a statement from Putin in July that the oligarchs would be allowed to
maintain their economic situation so long as they refrained from criticizing the
government or becoming involved in politics.”

Such statements linking criminal prosecutions to criticism of the government
reveal that the true motivation for Putin's “anti-corruption” campaign was a desire to
20
21

3

Tbid., 144 See footnote 150
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consolidate power rather than promote
the democratic principle of the rule of
law. This is
not to Say that the oligarchs represented the
liberal democratic idea. Far from it. Putin and

the oligarchs instead represent two sides of the same
undemocratic coin: the oligarchs the

product ofa quasi-anarchic society without
meaningful government power; Putin the
architect cfa resurgent state exerting its control over the economic and political
life of
the country. Just as the fall of the Soviet Union should not be
confused with the
beginning of a liberal democratic state, so Putin's campaign
of law and order should be
understood as the power grab that it was.

Regression of Democracy
Table 3.1 details the annual Freedom House rating given to Russia from 2002 to
2007. The overall freedom rating is given on a

scale from 1 —7 with | being the highest

degree of freedom and 7 being the lowest. Countries with scores from 1.0 to 2.5 are

considered free, countries scoring between 2.51 and 5.5 are labeled partly free, and

countries with scores below 5.5 are considered not free.. The freedom rating is further
broken down into the subcategories of political rights — the ability to participate freely in
the political process — and civil liberties — which allow for the freedoms of expression
and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy
without interference from the state — that are scored on the same 1-7 scale.
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Table 3.1: Freedom House Ratings: Russia 2002-2007
Year

Freedom Rating

Political Rights

Civil Liberties

(2002

5

5

5

2003

5

5

5

2004

5

5

5

"2005

5.5

6

5

2006

5.5

6

5

2007

Z

5.5

Source, Freedom House, Freedom

6

/

os

in the World Report, 2602 — 2012,

http://www. freedomhouse.orp/report/freedom-world/2007/russia (accessed April 13, 2013)"

As the Freedom House data shows, this time period was not kind to the
development of liberal democracy in Russia. These ratings represent a decline from the
3.5 rating — which equates to partially free — given in 1997.” This drop in international
perceptions of Russian democracy was caused by several factors. First, international
observers of democracy are not and cannot be unbiased. Their observations and analysis
of those observations is influenced by their own personal agenda — in many cases the

a

Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote

freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and
organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are
accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief,
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from
the state... Freedom House does not maintain a culture-bound view of freedom. The research and ratings

process involved 59 analysts and 20 senior-level academic advisors—the largest number to date. The
analysts used a broad range of sources of information-—including foreign and domestic news reports,
academic analyses, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, individual professional contacts, and

uisits to the region—in preparing the country and territory reports and ratings. while Freedom House
considers the presence of legal rights, it places a greater emphasis on whether these rights are
implemented in practice. Furthermore, freedoms can be affected by government officials, as well as by
nonstate actors, including insurgents and other armed groups. For a complete explanation of the
Freedom House methodology please see http://www. freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world2012/methodology
2s

Heiko Pieines. "Russia in Political Country Ratings: International Compariscns of Democracy, Rule of
Law, and Civil Rights." Russian Analytical Digest, no, 21 [2007]: 3
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promotion of democracy.”* Such biases can lead observers to gloss over imperfections so
as not to disheatten a nascent pro-democracy movement. As a result, the rating of Russia
as partly free in 1997 must be taken with a grain of salt. As the previous chapter
discussed, there were already electoral irregularities with regards to pre-election media
coverage under Yeltsin so the drop in Freedom House ratings under Putin can be
attributed in part to a recognition of the true deficiencies of democracy in Russia all
along.

Biased analysis should not be an excuse however for ignoring the very real
measures by the Putin administration to rollback democratic freedoms and consolidate
government power in a so-called 'sovereign democracy'.”’ One of the most significant of
these steps was transition from popular elections of regional governors to their direct

appointment by the president.” In and of itself, this move was not a violation of
democracy as the law.was changed according to proper legislative procedure. However, it

represented a troubling step away from the democratic principle of popular accountability
for public officials and the separation of powers.” By making governors answerable to
the president rather than local residents, this move simultaneously reduced the governors'
incentive to account of the concerns of their constituency and increased their dependence

on the good favor of the President. The move substantially blurred the lines of federalism

Judith Kelley, “Election Observers and Their Biases,” Journal of Democracy 21, ne. 3 [2010]: 164-166

Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, 135. The idea of sovereign or managed democracy refers te Putin's
preference for a strong state dedicated to enforcing the rule of law even at the expense of some liberal
democratic freedoms.
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designed to mitigate the concentration of absolute power in the national executive.”

Beyond the consolidation of power in the national executive, Putin also took steps
to reduce party diversity in the legislature with the stated goal of strengthening the party
system. While Russia had already established criteria for party registration and minimum
vote thresholds to weed out single issue parties, Putin substantially increased those
requirements with the alleged aim of promcting the dominance of a single party.*' Prior to
2003, Russian electoral law had established a minimum vote threshold of 5% to receive

seats in the Duma.** In 2002, the United Russia party — widely seen as the party of Putin
— began to push for a drastic increase of that threshold to 12.5%.** The leaders of smaller
parties resisted this change as they felt it would consolidate too much power in the hands
of United Russia and its allies.** The final result was somewhat of a compromise — the

threshold was raised to 7% with exceptions for extreme circumstance.* To put that in

Robert Coalson,
Appointments,”
April 11, 20123);
notwithstanding,

“Russia: Putin Takes Control Of The Status Quo Through Gubernatorial
Radio Free Europe, June 8, 2005, http://www. russialist.conv/9173-10.php (accessed
Putin's stated goal of fighting the corruption inherent in local and regional politics
this move still represents a startling centralization of executive power.
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2003

2007 pho

context, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe — a well respected
intergovernmental organization (IGO) — recommends that well-established democracies
maintain a threshold of no more than 3% for parliamentary elections to ensure adequate

representation.*°
At the same time, the Putin-led government also enacted changes to the electoral
system as a whole with the end result — if not the original intent — of limiting independent
opposition. From 1993-2003, the Russian political system was a mixed member system

under which some seats were allocated:to parties on a proportional basis while others
were single mandate seats — awarded to individual candidates who were not required to
belong to a party.’’ By implementing this policy while simultaneously making it more
difficult to register as a political party,** the Putin administration put a serious damper on
officially recognized political diversity.*? While even democratic countries have
requirements for party registration and the allocation of legislative seats, the severity of
the Russian requirements combined with the overall hostile tone of the Putin

administration towards unregulated democracy combine to create serious doubts about
the motivation for these reforms.

Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, “Resolution 1547,” April 18, 2007,
http://assembly.coe.inUMainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/ERES 1547 htm

(accessed April

16, 2013)
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Extent of the Middle Class
As the continued weakness of Russian democracy suggests, the middle class as an

independent group remained a relatively limited phenomenon during this time period.
Even as Russia managed to rebound from the financial crisis of 1997, the number of

middle class Russians at the beginning of the decade remained low. Estimates in 2002
ranged from as low as 7% by the Camegie Foundation to an optimistic 19% according to
the research firm Premier-TGI — an annual survey of consumer behavior and attitudes."
This objective evaluation differed sharply from Russians self-evaluation as a study by the

Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy revealed that more than half of
Russians at that time considered themselves to be middle class — a discrepancy pessibly
caused by the popular notion of the middle class as consisting of ownership of a car, flat,

and dacha.*' Russians who owned all three would likely self-classify as middle class even
if they lacked other non-economic elements of a middle class identity. By 2006, the
number of middle class Russians had grown due to Putin's revival of the Russian
economy. Zaslavskaia estimates the extent of the middle class at 11% of the general
population — 64% growth in less than five years.”
On its face, this growth paints a cautiously optimistic picture of a potential base
for liberal democracy in Russia. A 64% increase over 4 years in any demographic group

is significant especially if such growth can be sustained in the longer term. At the same

Sam Vaknin, “Russia's Middle Class,” United Press International, December 18, 2002,
http://samvak.tripod.conyvbrief-middleclass0|.html (accessed April 13, 2013)
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ons should be tempered by the realization that even after this growth the
time, expectatt

middle class @

ccounted for just 11% of society. It seems unrealistic to expect such a small

fraction of society lo affect significant changes on the social and political landscape even

encouraging, the political
if they 80 desired. The bottom line is that while such growth is

for the emergence of
reality shows that it still fails to provide a sufficiently broad base
liberal democracy 10 Russia.

ddle Class
Identity of the Mi

early
zaslavskaia identifies the middle stratum of Russian society during the
preneurs, managers at private
2960s as mid-level state employees, small to mid size entre

such as technology or
companies and highly qualified professionals with in demand skills

analogous to the
finance.” This middle stratum includes the middle class, but is not
relationship of the middle class to
middle-class as it includes state sector employees. The
Russian society as a whole can be
the middle stratum and the middle stratum in turn to

in Figure 3.1
imagined in terms of a series of shrinking circles as shown
al Population
Figure 3.1: The Relationship of the Middle Class to the Gener

.
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in this figure, the transparent circle represents the entirety of the Russian population,
the
hatched represents the segment of the population which falls in the middle income
stratum, and the black circle is the portion of the middle stratum which represents a true
middle class.
Mitigating Factors

While the Russian economy grew substantially during this period especially
compared to the 1990s there was not a significant corresponding growth of liberal

democratic ideals. Despite growth of small and medium sized businesses, there was no
significant corresponding push for democratization.” In part, this can be explained by the
{act that much of the growing middle class was not independent in any meaningful sense

of the word, Many of the Russians who were able to climb into the middle ciass were
neutralized as a base for political opposition by virtue of their employment in the

government sector. Much the same as soviet bureaucrats two decades early, it would be
naive to expect these “middle class” Russians to behave as in independent socioeconomic
group. As a report by the Levada Center in 2004 noted, based on their income levels
many mid to upper-level government bureaucrats fall into the boundaries of the middle
class, but are regarded by middle class workers in the private sector as a hostile force at
worst and unfriendly partners at best.** This means that data showing a growing number

Kommersant, "Small Business Share in GDP 13-15%," February 19, 2008,
http://www. kommersant.com/p-12072/r_500/economic_growth/ (accessed April i4, 2013); Interfax,
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Middle Class Attitudes towards Democracy

While comprehensive surveys of middle class
attitudes towards democr
acy are
hat lacking during this tim
e period, data from the Pew
©
Research Center's Global
Attiitud
tudees Project sup: ports the assertion that middle class Russia
ns have more favorable
altiitudes
tudes towards democracy. Table 3.2 is based on data collecte
d by the Pew Research
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er's Global Attitudes Project. The first
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ge of respondents who
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Table 3.2: Pew Global Attitudes Survey
Middle Class**
Le
|

' Lower Income

a
.

'

‘Honest Elections with at least 2
| Parties are Very Important

51%

47%

| Free speech is the most important
i value”?

24%

17%

| Freedom from hunger is the most

38%

44%

jimportant value
Source: Pew Research Center, "The Global Middle Class", Global Altitudes Project, 209°,
http://www pewglobal. org/2009/02/12/the-global-middle-class/ (accessed April 13, 2013)

As the table shows, there is a 14 percentage point gap in support for free and fair
elections between middle class and lower income Russians. Emphasis on freedom of
speech over freedom from hunger or crime and violence is lower emong both categories,

but support is still higher among the middle class. Higher emphasis on freedom of hunger
is to be expected among lower income Russians for whom putting food on the table is an
immediate concern while voicing controversial opinions is imore of a luxury. These

results are consistent with the theoretical literature which suggests that the higher level of
material security allows the middle class to focus on more abstract pursuits such as liberal
democracy. They are also consistent with my central thesis that the development of a
robust middle class is central to the sustenance of liberal democracy in Russia. There is
no way to further subdivide respondents into government and non-government
employees, but the results show that support for democracy is noticeable higher among
the middle class despite the inclusion of groups with a stake in the existing power
*S

Besed.on studies by the World Bank, the Pew Research Center defined the global middle class as people

earning more than $4,286 per year in standardized international dollars.
Respondents were asked to choose which of the following most important te them personally: fiee
speech, freedom of religion, freedom from hunger and poverty, or freedom from crime and violence
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structure, This could mean that even state employees display something resembling a
middle class identity or that support among privately employed members of the middle

class is high enough to hide lower levels of support among government workers.
Considering how central free speech is to the ideal ofa liberal democracy, the
lower level of support for freedom of speech among the middle class compared to honest,
multiparty elections may be even more interesting.””

50

One explanation is that middle class

Russians believe that government leaders — as long as they are legitimately elected deserve some measure of respect or immunity from criticism. It is also possible that the
low threshold for inclusion in the middle class for the purposes of this survey — $4,286 —

meant that some individuals were included which now or in the past have struggled with
food insecurity. The question was phrased in terms of choosing the most important value
which could lead to iower levels of support for free speech if some respondents valued

free speech but found hunger to be a more immediate concern.
Table 3.3 shows further polling data that provides a demographic breakdown of

support for democratization among Russians. Table 3.3 contains polling data from the All
Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion — a leading Russian sociological research

firm — from a survey conducted in August 2005. Two of the statements given to
respondents were: 1) Russia needs democratization of the political system, widening of
political rights, and the limiting of government bureaucracy's impact on politics and
society; and 2) For Russia it is now more important to strengthen the government,

*
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guiding order in all spheres of social and political life. The percentage of respondents
who agreed with those statements is broken up into columns by education level and
monthly income.

Table 3.3: Demographic Breakdown of Support for Democratization
|

Demographic Group of Respondents

L|

Education

|

Monthly Income

Beginning | School/Poly | Technical At least3} Less than | 150i- | 3000education | -Technic
Education | years of | 1500
3000 = | 5000

or lower | school

;college

| rubles

tubles

|iubles

[Greater
than

Russia needs

i

{114.09

(More important 68.64
\t0 sirengihen
ithe

government,

24.09

| 60.8

23.45
_

62.93

|

| 5001

|

| democratization

|

rubles

23.28
I

16437

21.62
_

16318

20.53
|

(66.6

126.83

| 21.99

i

1

'6138

|

|

|

67.38
|

Source: VTS!OM [All Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion]. “Poll of Russian Public Opinion.”
August 14, 200. http:/Awciom.nw/zh/print_q.php?s id=185&q_ id=15106&date=14.08.2005 (accessed April

11, 2013)."
The data shows increased levels of support for democracy and civil rights among
Russians making between 3000 and 5000 rubles/month — a lower middle class income. It

is interesting to note that support for democracy is lower and support for a stronger state
is higher among both lower income and upper echelon strata of Russian society. While
this thesis is focused primarily on differences between middle class and lower income
individuals, the declining support for democracy above a certain income level is

“|

The exact question asked: “Recentiy, many people are talking about the necessity of transition in the life
of society. Choose the statement about transition which you agree with the most”
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intriguing and perhaps a starting point for future research. Also included in the table is the
breakdown of responses by education level because some definitions of the middle

include some minimum education. While there is no direct correlation between increasing
levels of income and support for democratization, it is intriguing to note that the least
educated individuals — likely to find themseives in a lower incorne stratum — are also the
least supportive of democracy and most supportive of an empowered state apparatus,
Such data certainly appears compatible with the claim that the primary source of support
for democracy in Russia is the middle class.
Conclusion

Although this time period was troubling from the standpoint of liberal democratic
freedoms, the growth of the middle class provides some reason for optimism. Putin's recentralization of power reversed the lawlessness of the Yeltsin years, but his selective
application of the rule of law and manipulation of the electoral process reinforced the
illiberal nature of the Russian regime. The concentration of power was widely accepted

and even welcomed by Russians because of the continued weakness of the middle class
relative to their Western counterparts and the predominance of lower income strata more
concerned with economic sustenance than political freedoms. This link between a weak
middle ciass and weak democracy is backed up by polling results showing low levels of
support for liberal values outside of the middle class. For Russia, the Putin years proved
to be a case where the more things changed, the more they stayed the same.
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Reform Versus Relapse: The
Tandem Years
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This chapter looks at the Medvedev pres
idency as well as the managed retum of

power t0 Putin in 2012. Polling data regarding middle class
attitudes is lacking during
this time period, so the chapter draws primarily on a histori
cal analysis of the Russian
political and economic situation to establish the compatibility of the hypothesized link
between the middle class and democracy with reality. Specifically, this chapter examines
ihe dynamics of the protest movement since December 2011 to contrast the political
concerns of middle class Russians with the economic and social concerns of most

Russians. Ultimately, it argues that the protest movement is unlikely to result in liberal
democratic reforms so long as the movement lacks a substantial, independent middle

class social base.
Introduction
The last five years represent a series of contrasts primarily revolving around the

figures of Medvedev and Putin. Despite the nondemocratic anointing of Dmitri
Medvedev by Putin as his successor, when Medvedev first took office in 2008 there was a
sens¢ of hope among many Russians and even Western observers as Medvedev was

Vladimir Putin, Quoted in “Putin Calls Collapse of Soviet Union 'catastrophe',” Washington Post, April
26, 2008, hito:/Avww.washingtontimes.conv/news/2005/apr/26/20050426-1 20658-56875/?page=all
(accessed April 18, 2013)
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considered to be relatively liberal in his political philosophy.’ Further stoking these
positive feelings, Medvedev promised a modernization program which promoted societal
development rather than simply growth which produced relatively few benefits for most
Russians.* Medvedev advocated for economic diversification and increased innovation.‘

Such policies along with a rhetorical emphasis on governmental reform provided a
favorable environment for the spread of a middle class identity.
However, this spirit of optimism and reform came under assault from both
economic and political angles. The global economic crisis of 2008 sent energy prices

tumbling which resulted in the serious contraction of the Russian economy and dried up a
major source of revenues used to finance social spending by the government.’ As in most
financial downturns, the Russian middle class was negatively impacted to a significant
degree.° Beyond economic difficulties, the single event which most transformed the
Russian political landscape was the announcement by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
in November 2011 that he would run in the upcoming presidential elections in accordance
with the agreement made between Medvedev and himself in 2007.’ This announcement
>
>

Neil Buckley, “Medvedev Palatable to Russian Liberals and Western States,” Financial Times,
December !1, 2007.
Richard Rousseau, “Lights and Shadows of Medvedev's Modernization Plan,” Europe's World,
September 20, 2010,
http:/Avww.euronesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/PartnerPosts/tabid/67 |/PostID/18 12/language/en-

US/Detault.aspx (accessed April 13, 2013)
‘Andrew Kramer, “Economic Reforms Likely to Continue Under Putin,” New York Times, September 25,
2011
Luke Harding, “Russia Close to Economic Collapse and Oil Price Falls, Experts Predict,” The
Guardian, November 20, 2008, bttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/20/oil-missia-economiy-

putin-medvedev (accessed April 14, 2013)
° Ben Aris, “Russia's Middle Class Walloped by Crisis,” Moscow Times, October 28, 2011.
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increased the widespread feeling among the general population of their inability to
influence the country's political process and acted as a catalyst for a very public

opposition movement.®
Like the alleged voting irregularities in both the December 2011 parliamentary
election and March 2012 presidential vote, the arranged transfer of power did not
represent a new phenomenon for Russian politics.? My explanation for the unexpected
outcry in this case is the continued growth of a middle class during Medvedev's tenure
which had begun to hope for a more liberal, western style of democracy. This contention
is supported by polls showing the majority of protesters pushing for democratic reforms
could be categorized as middle class.'° That is not to say that all of the mobilized activists
are liberal reformers. There is certainly a marriage of convenience between such
protesters and other factions united only in their opposition to Putin's continued hold on
power.'' The radical nationalists and leftist parties generally fall into this category.
Despite all this, independent polling agencies continue to show a majority of
Russians support Putin as the country's leader.'? Not coincidentally, the surveys also show
*

Levada Analytical Center, Russian Public Opinion 2010-2011 (Moscow: Levada Center, 2012], 51,
http://en.d7154.agava.net/sites/en.d7154.agava.net/files/Levada2011Eng.pdf (accessed April 13, 2013);

At the end of 2011 Russians were asked whether elections made the government do
public needs — essentially asking whether elections make politicians accountable to
Only 8% of respondents said “Yes, to a considerable degree”. 52% said either “Not
“Absolutely not”
For a more in depth look at previous managed transfers of power see the discussion

what the general
their constituents.
so much” or
of the 1996

election, Yeltsin's appointment of Putin in 2000, and Putin's choice of Medvedev in 2007

Leon Aron, “Russia's Protesters: The People, Ideals and Prospects,” American Enterprise Institute,
August 9, 2012, http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/europe/mussiasprotesters-the-people-ideals-and-prospects/ (accessed April 13, 2013)
"' RIA Novosti, “Tens of Thousands Mass in Fresh Russia Vote Protest”, December 24, 2011,
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an overwhelming majority of Russians consider economic stability to be more important
than liberal democracy.'* While the protest movement highlights the recent growth of the
middle class, such data reinforces the continuing lack of a broad, independent middle
class. Putin has proved himselfto be a master of exploiting the economic fears of
population which considers even its meager financial situation to be continually

vulnerable to a return to the chaotic 1990s.'* Additionally, the growth of jobs in the
government bureaucracy along with subsidies for energy prices and social spending have
helped maintain a dependence on the government which significantly diminishes the
potential base of supporters for true reforms.'* Unless this situation is altered by the rise
of an independent middle class which is sufficiently organized and substantial enough to

both formulate and advocate for its own economic and civic interests, the prospects for
sustained liberal democracy in Russia are likely to remain bleak at best.
Middle Class Development

At the beginning of this period, the Russian middle class had just begun to
seriously feel the effects of the global economic recession.'® Nevertheless, measuring the

middle class.continued to be a complicated proposition. Russian sociologist Tatiana
Maleva created measurements of the middle class in 2008 using professional status —
Pew Research Center, ‘Public Opinion in Russia,” 2012
Leon Aron, “Russia's Protesters,” 2012

Alissa Carbonnel, “Seeking Kremlin Return, Putin Pledges Spending Increases,” Reuters News,
February 13, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-missia-putinidUSTRE81C10L20120213 (accessed April 11, 2013); Muhammad Iqbal, “Increase in social spending
to prevent unrest Russia: Putin," Business Recorder, October 17, 2011,
http://www.brecorder,com/world/europe/32079-increase-in-social-spending-to-prevent-unrest-missiaputin. html (accessed April 14, 2013); Belanovsky et al., “Socio-Economic Change,” 39
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defined by a combination of higher education experience, regular employment, non-

physical labor, and management position — possession of durable goods such as cars,
washing machines and televisions, and self identification.’ Her study showed that 21%
of the population met the basic income requirements for inclusion in the middle class,
22% met occupational and educational standards, and 40% self-identified as middle class

but only 7% exhibited all three properties.'* While the 2008 crisis did not decimate the
middle class to the same extent as the disorder of the 1990s, its effect was hardly
beneficial. In fact, the middle class arguably bore the brunt of this crisis as many workers
were forced to change occupations due to layoffs and typically took a pay cut in the

process."
We continue to see difficulties in distinguishing an independent middle class
during the Medvedev and Putin administrations. Many Russians who self-identify as
middle class — usually because of their income level — are in fact closely linked to and
reliant on the state for their economic well-being.” At the same time, Putin and
Medvedev’s economic policies did foster some real growth among the middle class."

"
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Medvedev in particular focused on private sector growth during his five years in office —
embarking on an ambitious strategy of privatizing $10 billion in state assets annually and
opening more industries to foreign investment.” A particular area of growth during this
time period was small business. The output of this sector — traditionally associated with
middle class entrepreneurs, managers, and workers — grew from 13% of GDP in 2007 to

21% in 2012.¥ While these figures are still underwhelming compared to 70% of GDP
associated with small businesses in Western economies, they represent a dramatic
improvement over the 4% of GDP associated with such enterprises at the end of Putin's
first term in 2004.*
Moving forward, the Russian government has set the goal of increasing the
percentage of the population employed by small businesses to 70% by 2020.” If

successful, this effort could have significant implications for the political development of
Russia. Based on the thesis that a strong, independent middle class is a force for liberal
democracy, Putin may unwittingly be creating the social force which brings an end to his
era of sovereign democracy. As more Russians reduce their economic dependence on the

government and join the ranks of the middle class, Putin's base of support among
working class Russians is likely to shrink. With the next presidential elections scheduled

Andrew Kramer, “Economic Reforms Likely to Continue Under Putin,” New York Times, September 25,

2011
Interfax, “Putin Dissatisfied with Share of SMEs in Russian GDP,” 2012; Kommersant, "Small
Business Share in GDP 13-15%," 2008
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for 2018, itis not out of the realm of possibility that Putin will face an actual, credible
challenge should he choose to run for re-election. That being said, it is also quite
conceivable that efforts to enlarge the middle class will fail to fulfill their promise —- much
like the majority of Medvedev's reform efforts — and Putin's authority will remain
unchecked at least through his second term.
Illiberal Democracy
As discussed in the introduction, one of the hallmarks of democracy — liberal or
illiberal — is the regular occurrence of genuinely competitive elections.” A certain
incumbent advantage does exist — which can extend to a retiring officials appointed
successor, but ina democracy the end result is not a predetermined fait accompli. In
2007, much as in 2000 with the transition from Yeltsin to Putin, no such competition for

succession took place.’ That is not to say that Medvedev's ascension to power was
without hope for supporters of democracy. Prior to his election as president, Medvedev
was known as a relatively liberal member of Putin's inner circle.”* He was chosen over
the objections of members of the si/oviki — Russia's security forces community — who
preferred a more hard-line candidate such as Sergei Ivanov or former intelligence officer
Vladislav Surkov.” As a result, there was hope in some quarters that Medvedev could
represent a departure from the para-constitutional “sovereign democracy” of the Putin

Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 1976
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years.” Even domestic opponents of Putin's regime seemed to think the Medvedev

represented a break from the previous mode of governance,’' While Medvedev's
administration did break from the Putin legacy on several points, most of the hope for
democratization went unrealized.

Putin's return to the presidency in 2012 raises another set of issues regarding the
quality of Russian democracy. As late as September 2011, some analysts genuinely
believed that Medvedev stood a chance of retaining his position outright or at least
presenting a credible challenge to Putin's re-coronation.” This illusion was shattered by
Medvedev's theatrical nomination of Putin for the presidency at the national convention

of the United Russia Party.’? Shortly thereafter, Putin remarked in an interview that the
entire arrangement had been agreed upon over five years prior as a means of skirting the
constitutional limit of two consecutive terms.** While there is no way to conclusively
determine if such an arrangement in fact existed, the fact remains that this type of
controlled transfer of power is not uncharacteristic of the Russian experience since the
fall of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin anointed Putin who anointed Medvedev. After 1996, it is
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hard to argue that any presidential election has been democratic if legitimate competition
is a prerequisite for democracy. Moreover, such an arrangement explicitly designed to

circumvent constitutional limits seems more appropriate for a personalistic illiberal
regime in South America not an alleged European democracy.”
Another hallmark of illiberal and facade democracies has been the manipulation
of the country's constitution essentially at will.*° This manipulation can appropriate
additional powers to the ruling coalition, remove checks on current executive authority,
or curtail some form of opposition. In any case, the process of constitutional modification
is used to cloak some illiberal policy in the guise of legitimacy. In the case of Russia

during this time period, pressure arose from Putin and his supporters to extend the
presidential term from four years to six.*’ The amendment was formally offered by the
United Russia Party and approved by Medvedev in 2008, but most analysts agree that the
entire sequence of events was orchestrated by Putin himself.** Amendments to the

constitution are not in and of themselves a violation of democratic principles. But when
an amendment intended to increase the authority of a specific individual is pushed
*
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through by a party which dominates both national and state legislatures a healthy amount

of skepticism is warranted.*”
Table 4.1 shows Freedom House's independent evaluation of the quality of
Russian democracy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the annual freedom rating is
given on a scale of 1-7 with | being the most free. The rating is also broken down into the
subcategories of political nghts and civil liberties which are rated on the same 1-7 scale.

Table 4.1: Freedom House Ratings: Russia 2008-2013

Yer
Y

|

Freedom Rating

Political Rights

Civil Liberties

Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report, 2002 - 2012,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/russia (accessed April 13, 2013)

—

The Freedom House rating of Russia is best described as continuity, The situation

neither improved nor deteriorated during Medvedev's government or Putin's subsequent
return to power. Whether this evaluation is accurate can certainly be debated. As
previously discussed, a managed transfer of power — or two in this case — is nothing new.
However, the government's response to opposition demands for free and fair elections in
late 2011 and 2012 seems to be noticeably more repressive than its past actions. During
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Putin's first term, he targeted influential figures — hostile oligarchs in particular — who he

considered a threat but rarely if ever used outright repression against ordinary Russians.
In the aftermath of the December 2011 parliamentary elections however, government
security forces attempted to limit public protest by denying or modifying applications for
large public gatherings, arresting both leaders and run of the mill protesters, and
exponentially increasing the financial penalties for unauthorized protests.*°
Freedom of the press — a hallmark of liberal democracy — has also suffered in
recent years. Table 4.2 shows both the raw press freedom score and the international
ranking of Russia for press freedom. Both numbers are calculated and published by
Reporters Without Borders — a non-profit NGO based in France dedicated to protecting
freedom of information around the world. The press freedom score is calculated on a
scale of 0 - 100 with 0 representing total respect for media freedom.

Table 4.2: Press Freedom Rating: Russia 2008-2013
Year

Press Freedom Score

Country Ranking

-

2008

47.5

141

|2009

60.88

153

'2010

49.9

140

(2011/2012
|2013

66
43.42

|

|

4
148

Source: Reporters Without Borders, 20/3 World Press Freedom Index, [Paris: Reporters WithoutBorders. :
2013] http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1054 (accessed April 11, 2013)
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As Table 4.2 shows, the 2013 Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders
ranked Russia 148" out of 179 countries for its media crackdown.*! Specific measures of

repression included the re-criminalization of defamation, banning foreign funding of
human rights organizations, and stricter control of the internet.” While there are

variations in press freedom ratings even among western democracies and the rating does
not take into account regime type, the Secretary-General of the organization has noted
that democracies typically ensure stronger protections for freedom of the press.*’ The
implication is that the lack of media freedom reflects Russia's illiberal governance.
Dynamics of Protest
Following the 2011 parliamentary elections and 2012 presidential elections, a
dynamic protest movement emerged the likes of which had not been seen in Russia since
the fall of the Soviet Union. A number of diverse groups spanning the entire political
spectrum were united by their shared disdain for what they perceived as the illiberal
nature of the Russian electoral system.” Left wing politician Sergei Udaltsov spoke at the
same rallies as liberal blogger Alexei Navalny and former treasury secretary Alexei

Kudrin.* The unity of such disparate actors in support of free and fair elections has been
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pointed to by some commentators as an indication that Russian civil society has finally
matured to the point that it poses a threat to the continuation of illiberal governance.”
However, a year later the protest movement has been unable to sustain its early

momentum. While the government is still taking a hard-line approach - recently
confining Udaltsov to house arrest for creating public disturbances — protesters have not
been able to draw crowds of 300 — 400,000 as they did in February 2012.*’ Admittedly,
support for Putin is down from its zenith but his approval rating in February 2013 was
still 65%," and the decline has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in
support for democratic governance.” All of these epiphenomena can be explained by the
continued weakness of the Russian middle class as a societal and political actor.
In the aftermath of the December 2011 elections, Russia witnessed the largest
protests in recent memory. The first coordinated event, held December 10, drew over

50,000 protesters in Moscow and 10,000 in St. Petersburg.” The protesters rallied around
opposition to perceived electoral fraud — demanding that the results of the December 3”
election be annulled and new, clean elections be scheduled.*' By the time of the next
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major protest on December 24, the movement had evolved beyond a simple demand for
chestniye vibori — clean elections — to a broader attack on Putin's entire system of
managed democracy.*? While Medvedev reacted in his State of the Union by promising
electoral reform, he maintained the position that the elections had been legitimate and the
results would stand. After a six week break, the civil society movement For Fair
Elections organized the largest demonstration yet — a mile long march from Kaluzhkaya
Square to Bolotnaya Square in the city center — with estimates of attendance ranging from

35,000 by the police to 200,000 by event organizers.*’ Bolotnaya appears to have
represented the high point of the protest movement. While civic society groups similar to
the For Fair Elections movement have continued to organize events, none of them have
drawn crowds on the same scale or been marked with such effective but non-violent
demonstrations.** It is possible that some future event could catalyze the re-emergence of
protests, but for now it appears that time and other factors have dampened the fires of
democratic protest.
As the previous chapters have shown, neither the electoral manipulation nor the
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managed transfer of power was a novel occurrence in Russia at this time. The protests
however, Were quite unprecedented since at least the constitutional crisis of 1993.°° What
then explains the change in behavior? A large part can be chalked up to the growth ofa
political middle class since the beginning of the 2000s. However a more complete
explanation recognizes the catalyzing role of disillusionment. When Dmitri Medvedev
assumed the presidency in 2007, Western liberals were not the only ones caught up in his
promises of liberalizing reform — both economic and political.*’ After Medvedev proved
unable to deliver on most of his meaningful reform proposals, the result was
disillusionment especially among the middle class which stood to gain the most from

successful reform.** By calling attention to the serious problems of Russian society and
then failing to solve them, Medvedev appears to have dissolved the complacency of the
middle class as they realized that meaningful reform would have to come from within
society rather than the government. This new self-mobilization gained prominence after
the elections of United Russia and Putin were fraught with illegitimacy which completed
the middle class's disillusionment.
Evidence of the constraints facing the protest movement became evident early on.
While some protests occurred in smaller cities, the largest events were constrained to
Andrew Osborn, “Protesters Chant ‘Russia without Putin' as Kremlin's Opponents Stage Unprecedented
Rally by Moscow River,” The Telegraph, December 10, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8948526/Protesters-chant-Russia-withoutPutin-as-Kremlins-opponents-stage-unprecedented-rally-by-Moscow-river.html (accessed April 13,

2013)
Vladimir Frolov, “Medvedev's Legacy as President,” Russia Profile, May 11, 2012,
http://russiaprofile.org/experts_panel/58597.html (accessed April 11, 2013)
Evgenii Guntmakher, “Fundament Peremen,” Gazeta.ru, May 2, 2012,

http://www.gazeta.rw/comments/2012/05/02_a 4569433 shtml {accessed April 13, 2013); Vladimir
Frolov, “Medvedev's Legacy as President,” 2012
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Moscow and St. Petersburg.” This was due not simply to the concentration of individuals
in those two metropolises, but their status as the centers of the Russian middle class.

Even at the height of the protest movement in early 2012, protesters were often viewed

by the average Russian as elitists who were out of touch with everyday life."' In fact, over
half of the protesters could be considered middle class and only 5% upper class, but since
the majority of Russians were still lower income they differentiated themselves from the

protest movement.” As a result, data from the Russian Public Opinion Studies Center
(VTsIOM) shows societal support for the protest movement remained fairly low and

dwindled even further as the elections become more distant.”
There is some support for the idea that the protest movement's slow decline was
due to the stark ideological differences of its supporters. At one rally in June 2012, rightwing nationalist protesters verbally clashed with liberals at an event ostensibly designed
as a joint rally. Perhaps instead of the demographics political partisanship is to blame
for the fizzling protest movement. Such a divide likely played somewhat of a role, but

* F Stephen Larrabee, “Russia Protests Are Overblown by West--Putin Is Here to Stay,” RAND
Corporation, April 17, 2012, http://www.rand.org/blog/2012/04/russia-protests-are-overblown-by-westputin-is-here.html (accessed April 13, 2013)
Maria-Luiza Tirmaste, "Boris Titov Proposes to the Government and the Opposition," Kommersant,
February 10, 2012.

Vadim Nikitin, “What Links Putin and US Republicans? Their Rivals Look like Elitists,” The Guardian,
January 20, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jan/20/putin-republicans-rivals-look-

like-clitists (accessed April 13, 2013); Maria Portnyagina, “Summer Plans? Russians Take Their
Protests on the Road,” Kommersant, June 23, 2012, http://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/summer-

plans-russians-take-their-protests-on-the-road/cls5710/#.USrUL6VQG8A (accessed April 13, 2013)
?Teon Aron, “Russia's Protesters,” 2012
® RT.com, “Protests Kaput? Russia’s Enthusiasm for Rallies Dwindling — Poll,” May 22, 2012,
http://rt.com/politics/protests-russia-putin-clections-presidency-2012-862/ (accessed April 13, 2013)
*

Clara Weiss, “Protests in Russia: Liberals, Pseudo-Left March alongside Far Right,” International

Committee of the Fourth International, June 16, 2012, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/06/protj16.html (accessed April 13, 2013)
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fails to explain why the initial protest movement failed to expand beyond the traditional
power base of the middle class. The urban — rural divide represents a somewhat inore
plausible alternate cause, however, protests were especially widespread in Moscow and
St. Petersburg compared even to other urban centers like Nizhni Novgorod.” The proof is
by no means definitive, but at the same time it does support the centrality of the middle
class to the development of democracy in Russia and the inhibitory nature of a large
population of lower income individuals on that samme development.
Looking towards the Future
While the last year was tumultuous for Russian society, as the dust settles the
most striking result is what has not changed. Despite indictments by public opinion on
the state of democracy in Russia, approval ratings for Putin have remained high. Putin's
current 65% approval rating is down from the heights of his first term but is actually on

the rise in recent months.” The third relevant data point is the approval rating of the State
Duma which stands in contrast to Putin's approval ratings at just 36%. Taken together,
the results of these three polis suggest that the majority of Russians still value pragmatic
things like standards of living and economic security over the abstract concems of liberal
democracy. High approval of Putin indicates that public disapproval of the Duma is
related to a widespread belief among Russians that the legislature is unable to take
effective action to improve everyday life rather than a rejection of the illiberal nature of

® Leon Aron, “Russia's Protesters,” 2012
“Pew Research Center, “Views of Democracy,” 2011
© Interfax, “Russians Support Putin,” 2013
* Tbid.,
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the entire government.” Such data, combined with the polling data showing higher
support for democratic values among middle class Russians, suggests that without a
significant enlargement of the middle class future political reforms are likely to be
focused on increasing government effectiveness rather than changing the illiberal nature
of government itself. The optimism surrounding the recent protests — like the optimism
immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union — is likely to remain unfulfilled as Russia

opts for a continuation of the status quo over fundamental reform.

® Qlga Doronina, “Russia's Regions Go Back to the Streets to Protest.” Russia Beyond the Headlines,
March 12, 2013, http://russialist.org/missias-regions-go-back-to-the-streets-(o-protest/ (accessed April

11, 2013); Further support for this idea can be found in an examination of ongoing social protest
movements in the Russian hinterlands. In contrast to the Moscow and Petersburg protests, these
movements are not political in nature. While they may have political ramifications for the current crop
of regional elites, they are more likely to change the hands holding the reins of power rather than the
system of power itself.
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